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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
All of the parties to this appeal are shown on the
caption of the case shown on the front cover.

In addition to

the parties named in the caption, Mountain Fuel Supply Company
("Mountain Fuel") is an entity directly affected by the outcome
of this case.

The parcel of real property at issue in this

quiet title action was sold by plaintiff/respondent Interstate
Land Corporation ("Interstate") to Mountain Fuel (along with
other property not at issue in this case) on or about December
20, 1985.

Interstate is a sister company of Mountain Fuel.

The sale from Interstate to Mountain Fuel was pursuant to an
exchange agreement supported by valuable consideration.
Pursuant to one of the terms of the exchange agreement,
Interstate agreed to diligently pursue this action to clear
title to the disputed tract for the benefit of Mountain Fuel.
Pursuant to Rule 25(c), U.R.C.P., Interstate will continue to
prosecute this action as the plaintiff/respondent
notwithstanding Interstate's transfer of the real property to
Mountain Fuel.

The lower court was made aware of the foregoing

facts and of Mountain Fuel's interest in the property in
question.

(R. 94, 198).

i

SPECIAL PRELIMINARY MATTER:
OBJECTION TO COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
As a preliminary matter, Interstate hereby renews its
objection to attorneys Ronald C. Barker and Larry L. Whyte as
counsel for the five appellants.

As noted on the caption, the

five appellants include R. D. Patterson ("Mr. Patterson") and
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R.
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll (the "Ingersolls").
Interstate filed a motion in the Supreme Court for summary
disposition and a supporting memorandum on or about February 3,
1987.

Although that motion was not granted, Interstate does

not believe that the Court ever reached the merits of
Interstate's request therein for an order disqualifying
appellant's counsel due to a conflict of interest between the
appellants.
Interstate believes that it is improper for Mr.
Patterson and the four Ingersolls to be represented by the same
lawyers because Mr. Patterson is named as a defendant in the
Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention.

It is

difficult to imagine any situation where parties on opposite
sides of the same case can be zealously represented by the same
lawyers.

See Comments to Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional

Conduct (effective January 1, 1988) ("Paragraph (a) [of Rule
1.7] prohibits representation of opposing parties in
litigation.")
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THE SUPREME COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS
APPEAL BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FILED IN A TIMELY MANNER
The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
appeal because the five appellants —
four Ingersolls —

Mr. Patterson and the

failed to file a notice of appeal as

required within thirty days after entry of a final order by the
lower court, as required by Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court.

On September 4, 1986, the lower court entered

separate orders denying the Ingersolls' motion to intervene and
granting Interstatefs motion for summary judgment against Mr.
Patterson.

(R. 1:146-153).

A copy of the lower court order

denying the Ingersolls' motion to intervene is attached to this
Brief as Addendum Exhibit K.

A copy of the lower court order

granting Interstate's motion for summary judgment against Mr.
Patterson is attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit L.
Within ten days of entry of the foregoing final
orders, Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls filed a document with
the lower court somewhat awkwardly entitled "Motion to Correct
Order or for a New Trial re Order Denying Ingersolls' Motion
for Permission to File Complaint in Intervention and Granting
Summary Judgment Against Patterson."

(R. 1:154-162)

(hereinafter the "Motion to Correct Order").

The "Motion to

Correct Order" was heard by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on
October 20, 1986.

At the hearing, Judge Murphy sua sponte

raised the procedural question whether Mr. Patterson and the
Ingersolls were entitled to file the so-called "Motion to
Correct Order."

(R. 1:229-230).

Mr. Patterson and the

Ingersolls claimed that their "Motion to Correct Order" was
authorized by Rules 59(a)(6) and (7), 59(d), 59(e), and 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 1:154).

At the end

of the hearing, Judge Murphy took the matter under advisement.
(R. 1:176; 1:244-245).

Thereafter, on December 2, 1986, Judge

Murphy issued a ten-page "Memorandum Opinion and Order."

(R.

1:177-186) (hereinafter the "Memorandum Opinion").
A copy of Judge Murphy's Memorandum Opinion is
attached to this brief as Addendum Exhibit M and is hereby
incorporated by reference.

Judge Murphy reached four main

conclusions in his Memorandum Opinion.

First, Judge Murphy

held that the "Motion to Correct Order" filed by Mr. Patterson
and the Ingersolls subsequent to entry of the final orders of
September 4, 1987 was not authorized by any of the
aforementioned Rules of Civil Procedure relied upon by them.
(R. 1:177-86).

Second, Judge Murphy concluded that even if one

of those rules -- namely, Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P. -- might in some
cases be applicable to a motion to alter or amend a summary
judgment, it does not authorize a party to file a motion to
alter or amend an adverse summary judgment when the party
seeking reconsideration argues no new facts or law.
1:184).

(R.

Third, Judge Murphy held that even if Mr. Patterson

could file a Rule 59(e) motion, the Ingersolls were not even
allowed to join the case as parties, so they at least had to
appeal from the order denying their intervention within thirty
days.

(R. 1:184-85).

Fourth, and in the alternative to a

procedural disposition, Judge Murphy reached the merits.
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Judge

Murphy "considered the entire record and [found] no manifest
error underlying the orders entered on September 4, 1986."
1:185).

(R.

Interstate's contention that the Supreme Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear this appeal is directly supported by the
analysis in Judge Murphy's Memorandum Opinion.

(R. 1:185).

Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls cite the decision in
Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir., 1983) in support of
the legitimacy of their "Motion to Correct Order."

In

Vreeken, it is true that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held under Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that a motion to file an amended
complaint filed after entry of an adverse motion for summary
judgment would toll the period for appeal.

718 F.2d at 345.

Vreeken seems to hold that "regardless of how it is styled or
construed by the trial court, a motion filed within ten days of
the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the
judgment is properly treated as a Rule 59(e) motion."
at 345 (citation omitted).

718 F.2d

The Utah Supreme Court should not

follow Vreeken because the rule announced in Vreeken does not
make sense.

In Vreeken, the court ignored the plain meaning

of a motion and held that a motion to file an amended complaint
was somehow intended to be a motion to alter or amend the
judgment.

Moreover, whatever might be the case in federal

courts, "Utah has adopted the majority rule that an order of
dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter a plaintiff
may not file an amended complaint."
P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1986).

Nichols v. State, 554

At the very least, even if this
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Court follows Vreeken, only Mr. Patterson1s appeal should be
deemed to be timely.

The Ingersolls were not allowed to

intervene, so they were not entitled to file a Rule 59(e)
motion that might have been available to Mr. Patterson under
the Vreeken rule.
Interstate recognizes that the courts are split on the
question whether a party like Mr. Patterson (but not: the
Ingersolls) can bring a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e)
subsequent to entry of a summary judgment.

See cases cited in

the Memorandum Opinion at R. 1:183-84; those pages of the
record are reproduced at pages 7 & 8 of Addendum Exhibit M to
this Brief.

The better rule is to encourage parties who have

lost a motion for summary judgment which is expressly styled as
a final order to end the litigation based on the strength of
the judge's ruling or, in the alternative, to file a notice of
appeal within thirty days after entry of that summary
judgment.

A party who has lost a motion to intervene must

likewise perfect an appeal within thirty days.

The rule urged

by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls undermines the finality of
judgments by the court, and is not authorized within the four
corners of either the intervention rule —

Rule 24, U.R.C.P. --

or the summary judgment rule -- Rule 56, U.R.C.P.
Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P. provides:

"A motion to alter or

amend the judgment shall be served to not later than ten days
after entry of the judgment."

Rule 59(e) merely recognizes the

inherent power of a court over its judgments.

It is not

designed to provide a vehicle for general reargument and
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reconsideration of summary judgments once entered under Rule 56
or of intervention rulings under Rule 24.
In Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Va.
1977), the court held that Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure does not authorize the party who has lost a
motion for summary judgment to file a "motion to alter
judgment/'

The court in Durkin explained:

Although plaintiff has labeled his motion a
"Motion to Alter Judgment" allegedly pursuant to
Rule 59(e), in actuality the plaintiff is moving
the Court to reverse its order granting summary
judgment to defendant and instead grant summary
judgment to plaintiff or, in the alternative,
grant plaintiff a trial of an allegedly disputed
material fact.
The plaintiff in his brief brings forward no
matter that could have been argued before
judgment was entered herein. His brief in
support of his motion is no more than an
expression of a view of the law contrary to that
set forth in the Court's opinion. Whatever may
be the purpose of Rule 59(e) it should not be
supposed that it is intended to give an unhappy
litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.
Since the plaintiff has brought up nothing
new -- except his displeasure -- this Court has
no proper basis upon which to alter or amend the
order previously entered. Judgment may indeed be
based upon an erroneous view of the law, but, if
so, the proper recourse is appeal — not
reargument.
This Court considers that no appropriate
Rule 59(e) motion has been filed. Support for
this holding may be found in Erickson Tool Co. v.
Ballas Collet Co., 277 F. Supp. 226, 234 (N.D.
Ohio 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1968).
. . . To the same effect and more directly on
point is Blair v. Delta Airlines, Inc.» 344 F.
Supp. 367, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
444 F. Supp. at 889-90.

What was said above in Durkin applies

_ c_

to the "Motion to Correct Order" filed in this case by Mr.
Patterson and the Ingersolls.
As noted in the Memorandum Opinion (see Addendum
Exhibit M to this Brief) neither Mr. Patterson nor the
Ingersolls filed any objection to the proposed orders which
were prepared by counsel for Interstate after the May 5, 1986
hearing and the July 28, 1986 minute entry, even though
Interstate complied with the requirements of Rule 2.9(b) of the
Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuits Courts of
the State of Utah.

See Certificates of Service at Addendum

Exhibits K and L; R. 1:148 and 1:153.

Rule 2.9(b) provides:

"Copies of proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall be
served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court
for signature unless the court otherwise orders.

Notice of

objections thereto shall be submitted to the Court and counsel
within (5) days after service."

(emphasis added)

The Supreme Court in Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233
(Utah 1983) stated:
Rule 2.9(b), Rules of Practice in the District
and Circuit Courts, requires that copies of
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
be served in opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature. The
requirement of service on the losing counsel is
for the purpose of permitting him to make
objections and propose amendments.
660 P.2d at 235 (emphasis added).

Accord, Calfo v. D. C.

Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986); Wayne Garff
Construction Co., Inc. v. Richards, 706 P.2d 1065 (Utah
1985).

It is extremely inappropriate for a party to make no
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objection in the lower court to a proposed order as required by
Rule 2.9 and then to complain on appeal about the proposed
order, as Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls do at pages 11 and
12 of their Brief.

In any event, by not objecting under Rule

2.9(b), Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls effectively concede in
their Brief that the two orders appealed from (Addendum
Exhibits K and L) do not "differ from the Court's announced
decision" and are "properly worded to accurately [state] the
substance of the Court's ruling."

See Appellants' Brief at 20.

Interstate agrees with Judge Murphy that l3ae holding
in Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 590 P.2d 3®5., 310 (11
Utah 1979) is not dispositive of the jurisdictional question.
The Rule 59(e) motion at issue in Hume was not an attempt to
reargue a motion for summary judgment.

Rather, the issue in

Hume was whether a party could file a rule 55(e) motion to
alter or amend a final judgment denying a writ of msandamus.

As

Judge Murphy noted, there are more opportunities generally
available for parties and advocates to present argument and
evidence in the context of a motion for summary judgment than
in the context of the petition for writ of mandamus.

Also, Mr.

Patterson and the Ingersolls made no objections of tihe orders
under Rule 2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice.

As such., the

rationale in Hume should not be extended to allow litigants to
file motions to reconsider summary judgments entered against
them.
There is also no merit to the reliance by Mr.
Patterson and the Ingersolls on Rules 59(a)(6) or 55(a)(7),

U.R.C.P. since those rules only apply to post-trial motions.
By definition, entry of a summary judgment means that there was
no trial because there were no material facts in dispute.

Rule

59(d), U.R.C.P. also does not apply because that rule only
applies to new trials granted at the initiative of the Court.
Also, Rule 60(b) does not apply because the Motion to Correct
Order filed by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls did not fit
within any of the seven categories in that rule.
The rest of this brief discusses the merits of the
appeal filed by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
There are only two issues on appeal.

The first issue

on appeal is whether the lower court properly granted
Interstate's motion for summary judgment against Mr.
Patterson.

See Addendum Exhibit L to this Brief.

The effect

of granting Interstatefs motion for summary judgment against
Mr. Patterson was to quiet title to the Vacated Street Property
at issue in this case in favor of Interstate.

The lower court

held that Mr. Patterson acquired no interest in the Vacated
Street Property under a certain quit claim deed (Addendum
Exhibit J) given to him by one LeMel Corporation (R. 1:150).
The second issue on appeal is whether the lower court
properly denied the Ingersolls1 motion to intervene.
Addendum Exhibit K to this Brief.

See

The Ingersolls want to

intervene to allege causes of action against both Interstate
and Mr. Patterson to quiet title in themselves to the Vacated
Street Property, either as a matter of record title or as a
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matter of adverse possession.

(R. 1:112-142).

In the lower

court, Interstate objected to the Ingersolls' motion to
intervene based on the doctrine of res judicata and/or
collateral estoppel, and on the merits.

(R. 1:197-200).

VERBATIM TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all determinative statutes and rules are
set forth above or in the main argument section of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below and Lower
Court Disposition
This is a quiet title action.

The real property in

dispute is located in Salt Lake City and is referred to herein
as the Vacated Street Property.

The Vacated Street Property is

described more particularly in this Brief, infra, at
Undisputed Fact Nos. 19-23.

The lower court quieted title to

the Vacated Street Property in favor of Interstate as against
Mr. Patterson.

The lower court also denied the Ingersolls'

motion to intervene based on the doctrines of res judicata
and/or collateral estoppel.

For a more detailed recitation of

the facts concerning the proceedings below and the disposition
by the lower Court, see the Orders attached hereto as Addendum
Exhibits K and L and Judge Murphy's Memorandum Opinion attached
to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit M.
B.

(R. 1:177-186).

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Appeal.
In the lower court proceeding, Interstate asserted

that there were twenty-six undisputed material facts that would
authorize the lower court to enter summary judgment in favor of
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Interstate against Mr. Patterson.

Also, in the lower court

proceeding, certified copies of the relevant deeds and other
documents of record were attached as exhibits A through J to
Interstatefs Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 1:16-69).

Undisputed Fact Nos. 1 through 26 in this Brief are identical
to Undisputed Fact Nos. 1 through 26 urged by Interstate in the
lower court.

The lower court order granting Interstate's

motion for summary judgment against Mr. Patterson expressly
incorporated by reference and adopted as undisputed findings of
the Court Fact Nos. 1 through 26.

(R. 1:150).

Attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibits A through
J are true and correct copies of the documents referenced in
the Undisputed Facts and which are included as part of the
lower court record at 1:16-69.

Also, attached to this Brief as

Addendum Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of a map which
was attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Licensed Surveyor
Raymond L. Griffith.

Addendum Exhibit N is a copy of R. 1:84.

The map at Addendum Exhibit N depicts the Vacated Street
Property at issue in this litigation.
Fact Nos. 27-44 in this Brief are based on the
undisputed facts in the record in the case of Salt Lake City
Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Third District
Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. C78-7764 (hereinafter the
"Salt Lake City Case").

In the lower court proceedings in this

case, Interstate submitted the file in the Salt Lake City Case
as the basis for Interstatefs objection to the IngersollsT
motion to intervene.

(R. 1:198).
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In the lower court

proceeding in this case, and on appeal, Interstate maintains
that the Ingersolls should not be allowed to file their
proposed complaint in intervention based on the doctrine of res
judicata and/or collateral estoppel.

The lower court in this

case reviewed the file in the Salt Lake City Case to reach the
merits of Interstatefs res judicata and/or collateral estoppel
argument against the Ingersolls.

(R. 1:198).

As such, Volume

II of the record on appeal in this case includes the relevant
portions of the record in the Salt Lake City Case.
In preparing the record on appeal in this case, the
Clerk of the Third District Court prepared two volumes.

Volume

I of the record contains the relevant papers filed in the lower
court proceeding in this case, plus the hearing transcripts.
Volume II of the record contains the relevant papers filed in
the Salt Lake City Case and reviewed by the lower court in this
case.

In preparing the two volumes of the record in this case,

the Clerk of the District Court numbered each volume starting
from page 1.

Accordingly, references in this Brief to the

lower court record in this case distinguish between Volume I
and Volume II.

For example, page 37 of Volume I is designated

as R. 1:37; whereas page 37 in Volume 2 is designated as R.
11:37.

No appeal was ever taken by any of the parties,

including the Ingersolls, from the various judgments entered in
the Salt Lake City Case.
1.

The real property at issue in this appeal

consists of approximately one-half acre of land located on the
west side of Salt Lake City near the intersection of First
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South Street and 1100 West Street.
at II 2.

Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton

(R. 1:105).
2.

The disputed property, which will be referred to

herein as the "Vacated Street Property", used to be part of
First South Street and part of Glendale Street, a north-south
street which intersects with First South between 1100 and 1200
West.

Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at If 3.
3.

(R. 1:106).

The Vacated Street Property was transferred from

public ownership to private ownership by an Ordinance passed by
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah on October
5, 1977 and published October 15, 1977.

By its terms, the

Ordinance took effect 30 days after its first publication
(i.e., it took effect November 14, 1977).

Specifically,

insofar as relevant to Interstate's dispute with Mr. Patterson,
the west half of Glendale Street and the south half of First
South Street west of 1100 West in Salt Lake City, Utah were
vacated (along with other property not at issue in this case)
by enactment of the aforesaid Ordinance.

A true and correct

copy of said Ordinance is attached to InterstateTs Brief as
Addendum Exhibit T .

Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at If 4.

(R.

1:106).
4.

Each property owner adjoining the Vacated Street

Property acquired fee title free of the former street easements
up to the midpoint of the old streets.
Hilton at IF 5.
5.

Affidavit of R. Donn

(R. 1:106).

At the time the ordinance was passed and the

Vacated Street Property reverted, the owner of record of what
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will be referred to herein as the "Brewery Property" on the
south side of First South Street and on the West side of
Glendale Street was Backman Abstract & Title Company, as
trustee under that certain Trust Deed dated July 6, 1977
(hereinafter the "July 6, 1977 Trust Deed").
Donn Hilton at 11 6.
6.

Affidavit of R.

(R. 1:106-07).

The July 6, 1977 Trust Deed was recorded July 18,

1977 at Book 4519, Page 1159 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office.

Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at 11 6,
7.

(R. 1:107).

A copy of the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed is attached

to Interstatefs Brief as Addendum Exhibit A.

As stated in the

July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, the trustors conveyed the described
land, "Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements
thereon and all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges
and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed
with said property, or any part thereof."
8.

(R. 1:19).

The trustors identified in the July 6, 1977 Trust

Deed are LeMel Corporation, a Utah corporation, and the
Ingersolls (i.e., the appellants in this case -- Melvin E.
Ingersoll and Marian Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, and Leland R.
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, his wife).
Exhibit A to this Brief.
9.

See Addendum

(R. 1:17).

The beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust

Deed is General Brewing Company, a California corporation.
Addendum Exhibit A attached to Interstatefs Brief.
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See

(R. 1:17).

10.

On or about August 31, 1979, General Brewing

Company, the beneficiary under the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed,
appointed Richard L. Blanck as the successor trustee under the
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

A copy of the "Substitution of

Trustee" document recorded October 19, 1978 at Book 1968, Page
1090 at the Salt Lake County Recorder's is attached to
Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibit C.
11.

(R. 1:26-29).

On September 7, 1979 and again on October 22,

1979, Richard L. Blanck, the successor trustee under the July
6, 1977 Trust Deed, filed "Notice of Default" documents with
the Salt Lake County Recorder.

The first default document was

recorded September 7, 1979 at Book 4939, page 1141.

The second

was recorded October 22, 1979 at Book 4969, Page 1069. True
and correct copies of the two Notice of Default documents are
attached to Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibits D and E,
respectively.
12.

(R. 1:31-39).
As stated more particularly in the aforesaid

Notice of Default documents, the trustors named in the July 6,
1977 Trust Deed had defaulted on a note in favor of the
beneficiary, General Brewing Company, in the sum of
$1,800,000.00.
13.

(R. 1:31 and 35).

LeMel Corporation, one of the trustors named with

the Ingersolls in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, filed a Chapter
11 petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code
with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah in Case No. 80-0755 on or about May 6, 1980.

The case was

converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding September 23, 1981 and was
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closed April 3, 1986.
10.

See Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at IT

(R. 1:107).
14.

On or about May 6, 1980, an undated Quit-Claim

Deed was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder at Book
5097, Page 1134, by the individuals named as trustors in the
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

The Ingersolls quit-claimed to LeMel

Corporation whatever right, title or interest they may then
have had in the same trust property described in the July 6,
1977 Trust Deed.

A true and correct copy of the May 6, 1980

Quit-Claim Deed from the Ingersolls to LeMel Corporation is
attached to Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibit F.

(R.

1:41).
15.

NACM Intermountain, Inc. became the duly

appointed qualified and acting trustee of the bankruptcy estate
of LeMel Corporation.
11.

See Affidavit of R. Donn Hilton at 1F

(R. 1:41-44).
16.

After notice and the opportunity for parties in

interest to be heard, United States Bankruptcy Judge Ralph R.
Mabey entered an order May 27, 1982 authorizing NACM
Intermountain, Inc., in its capacity as trustee of the LeMel
Corporation bankruptcy estate, to sell the same property
described in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed back to the
beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed -- General
Brewing Company.

A true and correct copy of Judge Mabey's

"Order With Respect to Trustee's Intent to Sell Real Property"
is attached to Interstatefs Brief as Addendum Exhibit G.
1:46-52).

(R.

17.

As stated in Judge Mabeyfs Order, NACM

Intermountain, Inc., as the trustee of the LeMel Corporation
bankruptcy estate, was also authorized by the Court to convey
to General Brewing Company not only the same real property
expressly described more particularly in the July 6, 1977 Trust
Deed (i.e., the Brewery Property), but also the contiguous
portions of the vacated First South Street west of 1100 West
Street and the vacated portions of Glendale Street north of
First South Street (i.e., the Vacated Street Property).

See

Addendum Exhibit G (Judge Mabey's Order) attached to
Interstate's Brief.
18.

(R. 1:46-47).

On or about June 3, 1982, NACM Intermountain,

Inc., the duly appointed qualified and acting trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of LeMel Corporation, conveyed to General
Brewing Company by a Trustee's Deed all of the LeMel
Corporation bankruptcy estate's right, title or interest in the
same seven parcels of real property described in the July 6,
1977 Trust Deed (i.e., the Brewery Property), as well as the
Vacated Street Property described in Judge Mabey's Order
authorizing the conveyance.

A certified copy of the "June 3,

1982 Trustee's Deed" from NACM to General Brewing Company,
which was recorded June 9, 1982 at Book 5381, Page 827, at the
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, is attached to Interstate's
Brief as Addendum Exhibit H.
19.

(R. 1:54-60).

The Vacated Street Property conveyed by the

bankruptcy trustee to General Brewing Company is identified in
the June 3, 1982 Trustee's Deed as parcel No. 8 and parcel No.
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9.

See Addendum Exhibit H attached to Interstatefs Brief.

(R.

1:56).
20.

Parcel No. 8 is described in the June 3, 1982

Trustee's Deed as follows:
The following described portion of vacated First
South Street being the South one-half of Vacated
First South Street lying between the West line of
1100 West Street and the West line of Glendale
Street produced across First South Street:
BEGINNING at a point 66.045 feet South of the
Northwest Corner of 1100 West and 100 South,
which corner is also the Southeast corner of Lot
1, Block 54, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence South 66.045 feet; thence West
330.0 feet; thence North 66.045 feet; thence East
330.0 feet to the point of beginning.
See Addendum Exhibit H to Interstate's Brief.
21.

(R. 1:56).

Parcel No. 9 is described in the June 3, 1982

Trustee's Deed as follows:
The following described portion of vacated
Glendale Street: Beginning at the Southeast
corner of Lot 1, Block 2, Jones Subdivision of
Block 54, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence North 82.5 feet; thence North
33°42f East 59.48 feet; thence South 132.0 feet;
thence West 33 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with the North one-half of vacated First
South Street adjoining on the South.
See Addendum Exhibit H to Interstatefs Brief.
22.

(R. 1:56).

On February 7, 1984, General Brewing Company, a

California corporation, conveyed by Special Warranty Deed to
Interstate the exact same nine parcels of real property
described more particularly in the June 3, 1982 Trustee's Deed,
including the Vacated Street Property described more
particularly in Parcels Nos. 8 and 9 thereof.

The Special

Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder
February 14, 1986 at Book 5531, Page 545 (hereinafter the
February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed).

A true and correct

copy of the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed is attached
to Interstate's Brief as Addendum Exhibit I.
23.

(R. 1:61-66).

The Vacated Street Property described more

particularly as Parcels Nos. 8 and 9 in the February 14, 1984
Special Warranty Deed is exactly the same Vacated Street
Property described more particularly in the March 11, 1982
Quit-Claim Deed (under which Mr. Patterson claims an interest)
and a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Patterson's
Answer.

See Affidavit of Raymond L. Griffith at If 4.

(R.

1:4-8 and 1:70-71).
24.

A true and correct copy of the March 11, 1982

Quit-Claim Deed from LeMel to Mr. Patterson is attached to
Interstatefs Brief as Addendum Exhibit J.

The Quit-Claim Deed

attached as Addendum Exhibit J to Interstatefs Brief was
recorded at Book 5349, Page 1360 of the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office March 11, 1982 and is referred to hereinafter
as the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed.
25.

(R. 1:68).

Although the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed was

recorded March 11, 1982, it purportedly bears an execution date
of July 27, 1979.

Although Interstate reserves the right, if

necessary, to later challenge the alleged July 27, 1979
execution date, and to raise defenses pertaining to the alleged
acknowledgement at that time in front of a notary, Interstate
stipulates for purposes of this appeal from the summary
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judgment that the March 11, 1982 Quit-claim Deed was executed
by LeMel Corporation July 27, 1979 and acknowledged by a notary
public on that date.
26.

(R. 1:93).

The March 11, 1982 Quit-claim Deed executed by

LeMel Corporation July 27, 1979 was a document of record when
General Brewing Company conveyed the February 14, 1984 Special
Warranty Deed to Interstate.
27.

(R. 1:93).

After Salt Lake City Corporation adopted the

aforementioned ordinances vacating First South Street and
Glendale Avenue (i.e., the Vacated Street Property), Salt Lake
City Corporation purported to rescind the ordinances vacating
those streets.

When the adjacent property owners objected to

the alleged recission, Salt Lake City Corporation filed an
action in Third Judicial District Court.

The action was styled

as Salt Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply, Third
District Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No. C-78-7764
(hereinafter the "Salt Lake City Case").

Salt Lake City

Corporation filed a "Complaint and Petition for Injunctive
Relief" beginning the aforementioned action on or about
December 14, 1978.
28.

(R. 11:2-10).

On or about January 5, 1979, LeMel Corporation,

and the same Ingersolls who are appellants in this case, filed
a motion to intervene in the Salt Lake City Case.
11:24-25).

(R.

The Ingersolls' and LeMels' motion to intervene in

the Salt Lake City Case came on for hearing before the
Honorable Christine M. Durham, District Judge.

By order of

January 18, 1979, District Judge Durham allowed LeMel
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Corporation and the Ingersolls to join the case as parties
plaintiffs adverse to Mountain Fuel.

Pursuant to Judge

Durham's order, the pleadings of Salt Lake City were adopted by
the intervenors in the Salt Lake City Case.
29.

(R. 11:29-30).

In a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities"

submitted on or about January 30, 1979 by the Ingersolls in the
Salt Lake City Case in opposition to a motion to dismiss filed
by Mountain Fuel, the Ingersolls stated:

"The complaint [in

the Salt Lake City Case] essentially alleges that a certain
public street was vacated by the plaintiff by an ordinance in
that the vacation has been rescinded by a subsequent ordinance,
but that the defendant [i.e., Mountain Fuel] has refused to
recognize the subsequent ordinance and is treating the street
as if it [i.e., Mountain Fuel] were the owner of the property
and is preventing public access."
30.

(R. 11:31).

On or about April 4, 1979, the intervenors in the

Salt Lake City Case filed a motion seeking permission to "file
their own complaint independent from the complaint of the
plaintiff [i.e., Salt Lake City Corporation] which was
previously adopted."

(R. 11:87).

The intervenors in the Salt

Lake City Case asked to file an "amended complaint" asserting
new causes of action against both defendant Mountain Fuel and
the plaintiff Salt Lake City Corporation.

(R. 11:80-86).

In

the aforesaid motion, the intervenors stated that the reason
for the motion was that the intervenors had "discovered that
they have some claims independent of the plaintiff and a
cross-claim against the plaintiff [Salt Lake City Corporation]
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and that they assert additional claims against the defendant
[Mountain Fuel] . . • ."
31.

(R. 11:87).

District Judge Durham conditionally granted the

interveners' motion to file an amended complaint.
149-50).

(R. 11:89,

Judge Durham only granted the intervenors'

conditional leave to amend because the court also granted
Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment against Salt Lake
City Corporation and the intervenors (LeMel and the Ingersolls)
on Salt Lake City Corporation's complaint, which complaint
originally had been adopted by the intervenors as their own.
(R. 11:149).
32.

On or about April 30, 1979, the intervenors in

the Salt Lakes City Case (LeMel and the Ingersolls) filed their
amended complaint, asserting causes of action against Mountain
Fuel and Salt Lake City Corporation.

(R. 11:151-157).

The

amended complaint filed by the intervenors in the Salt Lake
City Case expressly identifies the disputed property as
including the same Vacated Street Property at issue in this
case (i.e.,

First South Street west of 1100 West and that

portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street and First
South Street between 10th and 11th West).
33.

(R. 11:151-157).

Paragraph 4 of the prayer for relief in the

intervenors' amended complaint in the Salt Lake City Case seeks
"judgment against the defendant [i.e., Mountain Fuel] enforcing
the promises of the Defendant and estopping Defendant from
claiming any right, title or interest in the subject matter
real property."

(R. 11:156).
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34.

On or about May 24, 1979, Salt Lake City

Corporation filed an amended complaint in the Salt Lake City
Case adding LeMel Corporation and an entity named Latin
American Assembly of God, Inc. as co-defendants with Mountain
Fuel because it had become apparent to Salt Lake City
Corporation that those additional defendants also claimed an
interest in the Vacated Street Property at issue in the Salt
Lake City Case.
35.

(R. 11:158-72).

On or about October 11, 1979, in the Salt Lake

City Case, Mountain Fuel filed an "Answer to Interveners'
Amended Complaint", asserting numerous defenses.

(R.

11:184-192).
36.

In the amended complaint filed by LeMel and the

Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case, LeMel and the Ingersolls
asserted numerous causes of action expressing their
dissatisfaction with Mountain Fuel's assertion of control over
the Vacated Street Property at issue in that case.

For

example, at paragraph 30 of their amended complaint in the Salt
Lake City Case, LeMel and the Ingersolls claimed that Mountain
Fuel was "using the subject matter property as if it were the
owner and is denying the public the use of said streets and is
preventing access to the Brewery Mall, causing damage to the
intervenors in an amount to be determined."
37.

(R. 11:84).

On or about August 11, 1982, in the Salt Lake

City Case, Mountain Fuel filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment
against Intervenors, Memorandum and Notice of Hearing."
11:227-240).
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(R.

38.

The exhibits attached to Mountain Fuel's motion

for summary judgment against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake
City Case included the same Quit-Claim deed at issue in this
case (attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit F) and the
same June 3, 1982 Trustee's Deed from NACM Intermountain to
General Brewing Company at issue in this case (attached to this
Brief as Addendum Exhibit H ) . Compare R. 1:41 with R. 11:231
and compare R. 1:54 with R. 11:235.
39.

In Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment

against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case, Mountain
Fuel stated:
This motion is based upon (i) the pleadings (ii)
upon a certified copy of a quitclaim deed which
conveyed to intervenor LeMel Corporation the
interest of intervenors Melvin E. Ingersoll,
Marian Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, and Evelyn
E. Ingersoll in the property which is the subject
matter of their amended complaint (the "Brewery
Property") and (iii) a certified copy of the
Trustee's Deed from N.A.C.M. Intermountain,
Trustee in Bankruptcy for LeMel Corporation
conveying the Brewery Property to a third party,
General Brewing Company. Such pleadings and
documents establish as a matter of law that
intervenors no longer hold title to the Brewery
Property, that their amended complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and that the intervenors have no standing to
prosecute their lawsuit.
During the long, drawn out course of litigation
affecting portions of First South Street in Salt
Lake City, intervenors have attempted to have the
vacating ordinances affecting such portions of
streets set aside, as has cross-defendant, Salt
Lake City. The intervenors no longer have any
interest in the property allegedly affected by
such vacations nor do the intervenors have any
interest in a portion of First South Street which
reverted to intervenors as former adjoining land
owners upon such vocation [sic]. Intervenors
amended complaint is based on allegations that

_oo

their interest in the Brewery Property was
damaged by the actions of defendant and
cross-defendant. "It is essential, however, to
enable one to maintain an action for damages for
injury to realty, that he shall have some right,
title, interest or estate therein.ff [Citations
omitted]. No intervenor has such interest, and
as a matter of law, the motion for summary
judgment against intervenors should be granted.
(R. 11:228-229).
40.

The Certificate of Service attached to Mountain

Fuel's motion for summary judgment against the intervenors in
the Salt Lake City Case makes clear that copies of the motion
and of the notice of hearing were mailed to the Ingersolls
personally and to counsel for LeMel Corporation's bankruptcy
trustee.

(R. 11:229-230).
41.

Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment

against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case was heard by
the Honorable Philip R. Fischler, August 31, 1982, and was
granted.

(R. 11:241).

Coincidentally, it was Judge Fischler

who heard and decided Interstate's objection to the Ingersolls'
motion to intervene in this case on May 5, 1986.
(R. 1:194-221).

Without being reminded by counsel in this

case, Judge Fischler remembered the Salt Lake City Case on his
own at the May 5, 1986 hearing in this case.
42.

(R. 1:197).

Judge Fischler entered an order on or about

September 10, 1982 in the Salt Lake City Case stating that
neither the Ingersolls nor LeMel Corporation appeared at the
hearing on Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment against
them.

Judge Fischler stated that the court considered the

matters on file and was of the opinion that the motion for

-24-

summary judgment by Mountain Fuel should be granted in favor of
Mountain Fuel against the Ingersolls on the Ingersolls' amended
complaint and said amended complaint was "dismissed with
prejudice on the merits."
43.

(R. 11:242-244).

The Ingersolls never filed a notice of appeal

from the final "Judgment" entered against them on or about
September 10, 1982 by Judge Fischler in the Salt Lake City
Case.

(R. 11:242).
44.

On or about November 8, 1982, Mountain Fuel went

to trial against Salt Lake City Corporation in the Salt Lake
City Case.

Mountain Fuel won the trial and judgment was

entered in favor of Mountain Fuel against Salt Lake City
Corporation.

No appeal was taken.

(R. 11:310-311).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MR. PATTERSON IS PROPER
The Supreme Court should affirm the lower court's

order granting Interstate's motion for summary judgment against
Mr. Patterson.

Affirmance is particularly in order in this

case because Mr. Patterson did not file any affidavits or even
a memorandum in opposition to Interstate's Motion in the lower
court.

Mr. Patterson claims an interest in Vacated Street

Property pursuant to the July 27, 1979 Quit-Claim deed which is
attached to this Brief as Addendum Exhibit J.

The lower Court

properly held as a matter of law that Mr. Patterson has no
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property because
the grantor named in the Quit-Claim deed -- LeMel Corporation
-- had no right, title or interest in the Vacated Street

Property at the time LeMel Corporation purportedly conveyed the
deed to Mr. Patterson.
In the alternative to contending that LeMel
Corporation had no interest, Interstate contends that even if
LeMel Corporation had some interest in the Vacated Street
Property, the interest, if any, of LeMel Corporation was
subordinate to the security interest of the trustee and
beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

The July 6,

1977 Trust Deed was given by LeMel Corporation and the
Ingersolls to secure a $1.8 million debt incurred by them to
purchase the Brewery Property from General Brewing Company.

A

copy of the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed is attached to this Brief
as Addendum Exhibit A.

Interstate should win even if a trust

deed given to secure a debt only creates a lien against the
trust property.
It is undisputed that LeMel Corporation and the
Ingersolls defaulted on the $1.8 million debt secured by the
July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

It is further undisputed that LeMel

Corporation filed for bankruptcy and that the Ingersolls
conveyed their interest in the trust property to LeMel
Corporation.

See Addendum Exhibit F.

It is also undisputed

that the court-appointed trustee in the LeMel bankruptcy
proceeding, NACM Intermountain, conveyed the Brewery Property
and the Vacated Street Property (with U.S. Bankruptcy Court
approval) by Special Warranty Deed back to the unpaid seller of
the property -- General Brewing Company (i.e., the beneficiary
named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed).
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It is further

undisputed that General Brewing Company thereafter conveyed the
Brewery Property and the Vacated Street Property to Interstate
pursuant to the Special Warranty Deed attached to this Brief as
Addendum Exhibit I.
This court should rule as a matter of law that even
when the undisputed evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to Mr. Patterson (and the Ingersolls), that Mr.
Patterson (and the Ingersolls) lost whatever interest they
might have had in the Vacated Street Property when LeMel
Corporation and the Ingersolls defaulted on their $1.8 million
debt to General Brewing Company.

LeMel's successor, Mr.

Patterson, and the Ingersolls are simply not entitled to reap a
windfall on the Vacated Street Property after they defaulted on
their $1.8 million loan to Interstate's predecessor-ininterest, General Brewing Company.
B.

THE INGERSOLLS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE
This court should also affirm the lower court order

denying the Ingersolls' motion to intervene.

Under Rule 24 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Interstate recognizes that
generally it would be an abuse of discretion for a lower court
to prevent a party from intervening in a quiet title case when
that party asserted an ownership interest in the real property
at issue in this case.

In this case, however, the Ingersolls

were not entitled to intervene as a matter of right or as a
matter of permission.

The Ingersolls have already had their

day in court, so intervention is not appropriate.

Interstate

objected to the Ingersolls' motion to intervene on the grounds
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that their proposed complaint in intervention was barred as a
matter of law under the doctrine of res judicata and/or
collateral estoppel.

Specifically, Interstate submitted into

the record in this case the official court file from the Salt
Lake City Case described above in Undisputed Fact Nos. 27-44.
(R. 1:198).

On the merits, the Ingersolls should lose for the

same reasons Mr. Patterson lost.
The real property at issue in the Salt Lake City Case
included the same Vacated Street Property at issue in this
case.

Adverse litigants in the Salt Lake City Case included

the Ingersolls, on the one hand, and Mountain Fuel, on the
other.

Interstate is Mountain Fuel's privie for purposes of

this litigation because Interstate and Mountain Fuel are sister
companies (R. 1:198) and Interstate has conveyed its interest
in the Vacated Street Property to Mountain Fuel subsequent to
the initiation this lawsuit.

(R. 1:94).

In the Salt Lake City

Case, Mountain Fuel moved for summary judgment against the
Ingersolls on the theory that the Ingersolls no longer had a
right to participate in that case since they no longer had any
interest in either the Brewery Property or the Vacated Street
Property.

The lower Court in the Salt Lake City Case granted

Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment on the foregoing
theory and the Ingersolls did not appeal from that final order.
The doctrine of res judicata (i.e., claim preclusion)
bars the Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention because
the causes of action the Ingersolls want to assert in
intervention in this case should have been raised, if at all,
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in the Salt Lake City Case.

In the alternative, the doctrine

of collateral estoppel (i.e., issue preclusion) bars the
Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention because the
Ingersolls are estopped from relitigating the property
ownership issue specifically adjudicated in the Salt Lake City
Case adverse to the Ingersolls (i.e., the issue determined in
the Salt Lake City Case that the Ingersolls no longer have any
right, title or interest in the Brewery Property or the Vacated
Street Property).

(R. 11:227-230; 11:242-244).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED INTERSTATEyS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PATTERSON
A.

MR. PATTERSON ACQUIRED NO INTEREST IN THE VACATED
STREET PROPERTY UNDER THE MARCH 11, 1982 QUIT-CLAIM
DEED FROM LeMEL CORPORATION BECAUSE LeMEL CORPORATION
HAD NO INTEREST IN THE VACATED STREET PROPERTY
The issue in this case, as between Interstate and Mr.

Patterson, is who owns a certain parcel of land near 1100 West
and 100 South in Salt Lake City.

The disputed property is

described herein as the Vacated Street Property.

The Vacated

Street Property is described more particularly in the March 11,
1982 Quit-Claim Deed under which Mr. Patterson claims an
interest.

See Addendum Exhibit J.

The Vacated Street Property

is also described more particularly as parcels Nos. 8 and 9 in
the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed under which
Interstate claims an interest.

See Addendum Exhibit I.

Although the property descriptions in Mr. Patterson's March 11,
1982 Quit-Claim Deed and in Interstate?s February 14, 1984
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Special Warranty Deed are different, it is undisputed that the
property descriptions contained in those two deeds pertain to
the exact same piece of land.
Griffith at H 4.

See Affidavit of Raymond L.

(R. 1:70-71).

In Brigham Truck & Implement Company v. Fridal, 71
Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (S.Ct. Nov. 27, 1987), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a 1984 holding that, when a motion for summary
judgment is filed, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided for in the rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial."

(citation omitted).

In this case, Mr. Patterson and

the Ingersolls ignored that rule and submitted no affidavits or
memoranda in opposition to Interstate's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Accordingly, Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls should

not be allowed to claim on appeal that there is a disputed
issue of fact.
The Vacated Street Property is immediately adjacent to
a much larger parcel of land that has been historically used as
a beer brewery.

The old beer brewery property is referred to

herein as the Brewery Property.
General Brewing Company.

It was originally owned by

The Brewery Property is that real

property more particularly described as parcels Nos. 1 through
7 in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

See Addendum Exhibit A.

The

first seven parcels described in the February 14, 1984 Special
Warranty Deed (see Addendum Exhibit I) (under which Interstate
claims an interest) are the same seven parcels described in the

-30-

July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

Whereas the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed

only expressly describes the Brewery Property (i.e. Parcel Nos.
1-7), the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed expressly
describes both the Brewery Property (parcels Nos. 1-7) and the
Vacated Street Property (parcels Nos. 8-9).

Compare Addendum

Exhibits A and I.
Assuming for purposes of this Appeal that the March
11, 1982 Quit-claim Deed (Addendum Exhibit J) from LeMel
Corporation to Mr. Patterson was properly executed,
acknowledged, and delivered, it had "the effect of a conveyance
of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of such
conveyance."

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 (1953, as amended).

However, it is well settled that the grantor of a quit-claim
deed makes no warranty to the grantee that the grantor
necessarily has any interest in the property conveyed.

That

is, a conveyance by a quit-claim deed gives only the grantor's
interest, if any, and implies nothing more.

See Johnson v.

Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 312 (Utah 1983); Wallace v. Build Inc.,
16 Utah 2d 401, 405, 402 P.2d 699, 701 (1965); Nix v. Tooele
County, 101 Utah 84, 87, 118 P.2d 376, 377 (1941).

It

follows, therefore, that a grantee under a quit-claim deed
acquires no right, title or interest from his grantor in the
property described in the quit-claim deed if the grantor has no
right, title or interest in said property at the time of the
conveyance.
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There is no magic in recording a quit-claim deed
purporting to convey something in which the purported grantor
had no interest.

Cf., Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah

1979) (holding that a grantor may not effectively reserve a
right in real property to himself unless the grantor already
possesses the right purportedly reserved); Peay v. B&N Inc.,
24 Utah 2d 86, 89, 465 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1970) (holding that
recordation of a certain real estate sales contract "in no
sense encumbered the property" because at the time of the
recording the "seller" described in the real estate contract
did not have title to the property described in the contract).
It is undisputed that the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim
Deed under which Mr. Patterson claims an interest was recorded
prior in time to the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed
under which Interstate claims an interest.

The issue raised by

Interstate1s Motion is not, therefore, whether Interstate had
constructive notice of Mr. Patterson's Quit-Claim Deed at the
time Interstate acquired title to the Vacated Street Property.
Rather, the issue raised by Interstatefs Motion is whether
LeMel Corporation had any right, title or interest whatsoever
in the Vacated Street Property on July 27, 1979 -- the date
LeMel Corporation purportedly executed the March 11, 1982
Quit-Claim Deed in favor of Mr. Patterson.

In the alternative,

the issue is whether LeMelfs interest, if any, in the Vacated
Street Property was at least subordinate to the interest in the
Vacated Street Property held by trustee and the beneficiary
named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.
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Based on the undisputed facts, the lower court ruled
as a matter of law that LeMel Corporation did not have any
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property as of
July 27, 1979.

The lower court so held because LeMel

Corporation (along with the four Ingersolls, who were
principals in LeMel Corporation) had--pursuant to the July 6,
1977 Trust Deed (Addendum Exhibit A) -- previously conveyed to
trustee Backman Abstract & Title Company, for the benefit of
General Brewing Company, all of their right, title and interest
in the property to secure a $1.8 million note which they had
signed in favor of General Brewing Company.

When Salt Lake

City thereafter abandoned the Vacated Street Property -effective November 14, 1977 pursuant to an Ordinance (Addendum
Exhibit B) -- the city's street easement in said street
property automatically reverted as a matter of law up to the
middle of the streets to the adjoining property holders.

See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-101 (1953, as amended) ("A transfer of
land bounded by a public highway on a right-of-way for which
the public has only an easement passes the title of the person
whose estate is transferred to the middle of the highway.")
The Vacated Street Property at issue in this case thus
automatically reverted to Backman Abstract and Title, the
trustee under the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed, as additional
security for the trustors' debt to the beneficiary.
Mr. Patterson maintains that when Salt Lake City
abandoned the Vacated Street Property effective November 14,
1977, that said property somehow reverted to the trustors LeMel
Corporation and the four Ingersolls (i.e., rather than to the

trustee Backman Abstract and Title).

Mr. Patterson (and the

Ingersolls) even go so far as to claim that the lien created by
the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed did not attach to the Vacated
Street Property to secure the debt.

However, Utah Code Ann.

§ 57-1-20 expressly provides that after-acquired title
automatically inures to the benefit of the trustee under a
trust deed as security for the debt owed to the beneficiary and
does not to inure to the benefit of the trustors.

Section

57-1-20 provides:
Transfers in trust of real property may be made
to secure the performance of an obligation of the
trustor or any other person named in the trust
deed to a beneficiary. All right, title,
interest and claim in and to the trust property
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in
interest, subsequent to the execution of the
trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as
security for the obligation or obligations for
which the trust property is conveyed in like
manner as if acquired before execution of the
trust deed.
Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, the lower court ruled as a matter

of law that, effective November 14, 1977 (i.e., 30 days after
first publication on October 15, 1977 of the Ordinance attached
as Addendum Exhibit B ) , the Vacated Street Property
automatically inured to the benefit of the trustee, Backman
Abstract & Title Company, as security for the trustors' debt to
General Brewing Company, the beneficiary.

The Vacated Street

Property thereafter inured to Richard L. Blanck as security for
the debt when he was designated the substituted trustee on or
about August 31, 1979 by General Brewing Company, the
beneficiary.

(See Addendum Exhibit C ) .
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According to the September 7, 1979 and the October 22,
1979 Notice of Default documents recorded by Mr. Blanck (see
Addendum Exhibits D and E), LeMel Corporation and the four
Ingersoll individuals eventually defaulted on the $1.8 million
note which they had signed to buy the Brewery Property from
General Brewing Company and which note was secured by the July
6, 1977 Trust Deed.

Thereafter, with the debt to General

Brewing Company still unsatisfied, LeMel Corporation filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (Case No. 80-00755).
The Ingersolls quit-claimed whatever interest they had in the
trust property to LeMel Corporation (See Addendum Exhibit F).
NACM Intermountain, Inc. became LeMel Corporation's
duly-appointed trustee in bankruptcy.

As a secured creditor in

the bankruptcy proceeding (i.e., for the $1.8 million Brewery
Property loan secured by the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed), General
Brewing Company was able to enter into an agreement with the
bankruptcy estate trustee, NACM Intermountain, whereby NACM
conveyed the property back to General Brewing Company.

NACM,

as LeMelvs trustee in bankruptcy, sought and obtained
Bankruptcy Court approval to expressly convey both the Brewery
Property and the Vacated Street Property to General Brewing
Company.

(See Addendum Exhibit G).

The Vacated Street

Property was conveyed to General Brewing Company by NACM
Intermountain.
Exhibit H ) .

(See Parcels Nos. 8 and 9 described in Addendum

General Brewing Company thereafter conveyed the
Brewery Property and the Vacated Street Property to Interstate
by means of the February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed.
(Addendum Exhibit I).

As established in the Affidavit of

Raymond L. Griffith at % 4, IL 1:71, the Vacated Street
Property described as Parcels Nos- 8 and 9 in Interstatefs
February 14, 1984 Special Warranty Deed is the exact same
Vacated Street Property described in Mr. Patterson1s March 11,
1982 Quit-Claim Deed.
Although the foregoing facts may seem at first blush
to be somewhat complicated, none of them are disputed.
Moreover, at its core, the legal issue is this case is very
straightforward.

Specifically, the key issue is whether LeMel

Corporation had any interest whatsoever in the Vacated Street
Property as of July 27, 1979 when LeMel Corporation purportedly
executed the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed in favor of Mr.
Patterson.

In the alternative, the issue is whether LeMelfs

interest in the Vacated Street Property, if any, was
subordinate to that of the interest of the trustee and
beneficiary named in the July 6, 1977 Trust Deed.

The lower

court properly held against Mr. Patterson because LeMel gave
nothing to Mr. Patterson or at least LeMel gave Mr. Patterson
no title superior to LeMelfs secured creditor under the Trust
Deed.
B.

(R. 1:150).

INTERSTATE WINS EVEN IT A TKDST DEED DOES NOT CONVEY TITLE
BUT ONLY CREATES A LIEN
Mr. Patterson (and the Ingersolls) seem to think that
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it matters in this case whether Utah is a so-called
state" or a so-called "title state."

f,

lien

See Appellant's Brief at

10-11, wherein they cite Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189
P.2d 118 (1948) for the proposition that a trustee under a
trust deed holds only a lien or security interest in the
property by reason of the trust deed.

Mr. Patterson and the

Ingersolls claim that the trustee named in the July 6, 1977
Trust Deed is not the real "owner" of the Brewery Property so
as to vest ownership of the Vacated Street Property in the
trustee under the trust deed.
Interstate recognizes that Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-8
(1953, as amended) states:

"A mortgage of real property shall

not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable
the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real
property without a foreclosure and sale."

See generally Brief

submitted by Mr. Patterson and the Ingersolls at 10-11.

A

trust deed is different from a mortgage under Utah law.
However, for purposes of this appeal, the Supreme Court does
not need to decide whether a trust deed conveys "title" to a
trustee, or whether the trustee merely acquires a "lien"
against the property as security for the debt referenced in the
trust deed.
Interstate argued in the lower court that it is
entitled to summary judgment against Mr. Patterson even if Utah
is a lien state.

(R. 1:214).

The rationale for Interstatefs

argument is that LeMel (Mr. Patterson's grantor) and the
Ingersolls gave General Brewing Company a trust deed to secure
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a $1.8 million debt.

Thereafter, LeMel Corporation and the

Ingersolls defaulted on the debt.

LeMel Corporation filed for

bankruptcy and the four Ingersolls conveyed by quit claim deed
whatever interest they had in the trust property to LeMel.
Thereafter, LeMel's bankruptcy trustee, NACM Intermountain,
conveyed the property back to the unpaid beneficiary named in
the trust deed.

After General Brewing Company got the Brewery

Property and the Vacated Street Property back from the
bankruptcy trustee, General Brewing Company proceded to resell
the property to Interstate.

As such, Interstate is the direct

successor in interest to General Brewing Company.

Since Mr.

Patterson (and the Ingersolls) concede that they at least gave
a lien to the trustee to secure their $1.8 million debt to
General Brewing Company, they should not now be heard to
complain that the lien was foreclosed for the benefit of their
unpaid seller when they defaulted on the debt.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon decided a case
remarkably similar to this case in Umpqua Savings & Loan Ass'n.
v. Security Bank of Coos County, 71 Or. App. 555, 693 P.2d 57
(1984) (hereinafter Umpqua).

Umpqua was a declaratory

judgment action to determine the relative priority of a trust
deed held by a savings and loan vis-a-vis a prior-recorded
trust deed held by a bank.

Exactly like this case, the

property at issue in the Umpqua was certain vacated municipal
street property which had reverted to the abutting property
owners (under an Oregon statute substantially similar to Utah's
statute).

In Umpqua, a property owner who owned real property
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on both sides of a certain street named "Edwards Avenue" gave a
trust deed to the bank to secure a loan of $150,000.

The trust

deed described the real property on both sides of Edwards
Avenue "together with all the improvements now or hereafter
erected and all easements, rights, appurtenances, . . . ."
P.2d at 58.

693

As in this case, the trust deed given to the bank

did not include a metes and bounds description of Edwards
Avenue because Edwards Avenue was a public street at the time
the property owner borrowed the money and conveyed the trust
deed.

Thereafter, as in this case, the city enacted an

ordinance vacating Edwards Avenue, with the effect that it
reverted to the property owner who undeniably owned land on
both sides of Edwards Avenue.
Subsequent to the vacation of Edwards Avenue, the
property owner in Umpqua borrowed an additional $46,000 from a
different lending institution -- the savings and loan - - t o
build a single family residence on the vacated Edwards Avenue.
The trust deed given to the savings and loan expressly
described the Edwards Avenue street property.

The savings and

loan instituted Umpqua as a declaratory judgment action when
there was a default on the $46,000 loan.

As between the bank

and the savings and loan, the bank won.

The Court of Appeals

of Oregon held in favor of the bank even though the bank's
prior-recorded trust deed did not expressly describe Edwards
Avenue, whereas the savings & loan's later trust deed did
expressly describe Edwards Avenue.
explained:
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The Court in the Umpqua

Defendant's [i.e., the bank's] trust deed also
covered "all * * * rights" of the described real
property that bordered on the north and south
lines of Edwards Avenue. When defendant [i.e.,
the bank] first took and recorded its trust deed
the Luecks and Lairds [i.e., the "property owner"
described above] owned that adjacent real
property. Their "right" under ORS 271.140 to
title in the street if it were vacated was one of
the "rights" that their trust deed granted to
defendant. Before plaintiff [i.e., the savings
and loan] had taken or recorded its trust deed,
the city had vacated the street, and the lien of
defendant's [i.e., the bank's] trust deed had
attached to and covered the title to vacated
Edwards Avenue.
693 P.2d at 59 (citation omitted).

Likewise, in this case the

July 6, 1977 Trust Deed given by LeMel Corporation and the
Ingersolls to secure their $1.8 million debt to General Brewing
Company conveyed to the trustee all of the Brewery Property,
"TOGETHER WITH all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon
and all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents, issues,
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with
said property, or any part thereof."
this Brief; R. 1:19.

See Addendum Exhibit A to

Thus, even if Utah is a "lien state" with

respect to trust deeds, this court should rule as a matter of
law that the lien created by LeMel Corporation and the
Ingersolls extended to the Vacated Street Property once that
property inured to the benefit of the Brewery Property as a
"privilege" thereof.
Although the lower court judgment in favor of
Interstate should be affirmed regardless of whether Utah is a
lien state or a title state, Interstate notes that there is
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substantial reason to believe that Utah is a title state with
respect to trust deeds, even though Utah is a lien state with
respect to mortgages. Utah Code. Ann. § 57-1-19(4) (1953, as
amended) defines a "trustee" under a trust deed as "a person to
whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or his
successor in interest."

Section 57-1-19(5) defines "real

property" expansively as meaning "any estate or interest in
land, including all buildings, fixtures and improvements
thereon and all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or enjoyed with
said land, or any part thereof."

Furthermore, the term "trust

property" is defined as meaning "the real property conveyed by
the trust deed."

Reading those foregoing definitional statutes

in conjunction with § 57-1-20 (quoted verbatim above) there is
a strong reason to conclude that the Legislature intended for
trust deeds to convey title to the trustee even though a
mortgage only creates a lien in favor of the mortgagee.
Commentators have recognized the distinction between
mortgages and trust deeds.

See BYU Summary of Utah Real

Property Law, § 9.44 (1978) ("With a mortgage, title remains
with the mortgagor until the foreclosure sale at which time it
passes from the mortgagor to the purchaser.

In the deed of

trust, title passes to the trustee who holds it until
satisfaction or default.

Upon foreclosure sale it passes from

trustee to purchaser.")

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See also Shores v. Rabon, 251 N.C. 790, 112 S.E.2d 556 (1960)
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stating that the trustee under a deed of trust "holds the legal
title").
For the foregoing reasons, Interstate seeks affirmance
of the summary judgment holding that Mr. Patterson acquired no
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property by
virtue of the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed.
C.

INTERSTATE IS ALSO ENTITLED TO AFFIRMANCE OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON MR. PATTERSON'S THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Based on the undisputed facts, the lower court also

granted summary judgment in favor of Interstate and against Mr.
Patterson with respect to the third, fourth and fifth
affirmative defenses raised in Mr. Patterson's answer.
With regard to Mr. Patterson's third defense, Mr.
Patterson claims that the March 11, 1982 Quit-Claim Deed only
gave him a one-fifth interest in the real property described
therein.

See Mr. Patterson's Answer at page 2.

(R. 1:4-5).

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Patterson did not even get
a one-fifth interest.

Furthermore, the March 11, 1982

Quit-Claim Deed makes no such qualification upon the extent of
the interest conveyed.

See Addendum Exhibit J.

Therefore, the

lower court ruled as a matter of law under Utah Code Ann. §
57-1-13 (1953, as amended) that LeMel Corporation conveyed all
of its interest, if any.

(R. 1:102, 151). It is well settled

that construction of deeds is a question of law for the Court
in the absence of ambiguity and that where a deed is plain and
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary its
terms.

Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979).
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The lower court also ruled as a matter of law against
Mr. Patterson on his fourth and fifth affirmative defenses,
which defenses claimed that the Ingersolls needed to be parties
to this case.

Since the Ingersolls tried to intervene and were

not allowed to intervene, the next section of this Brief will
explain why the Ingersolls are not necessary parties.

(R.

1:102, 151).
II.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
INGERSOLLS1 MOTION TO INTERVENE
The lower court denied the Ingersolls' motion to
intervene because the Ingersolls had already had their day in
court in the Salt Lake City Case.

Certainly a lower court does

not abuse its discretion by preventing a party from intervening
in a case if the party's proposed complaint in intervention is
barred by principles of res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel.

The Ingersolls claim in their Brief (at page 13)

that they somehow "were unfairly taken by surprise at the
hearing on the motion for permission to intervene by
plaintiff's [i.e. Interstate's] argument that their right to
intervene might be affected by the holding in another case
involving these parties."
is disingenuous at best.

The Ingersolls claim of "surprise"
In fact, it was Interstate who was

surprised by the Ingersolls eleventh hour motion to intervene
in the case.

On or about April 25, 1986, counsel for

Interstate served a notice of hearing on counsel for Mr.
Patterson that Interstate's motion for summary judgment against

Mr. Patterson would be heard May 5, 1986 before the Honorable
Philip R. Fischler. (R. 1:110-111).

Since the Ingersolls were

not a party to the action, they were not served with a copy of
the notice of hearing.

Nonetheless, somehow the Ingersolls

learned of the scheduled hearing.

Two days before that

hearing, on or about May 3, 1986, counsel for the Ingersolls
served the Ingersolls' "Motion for Permission to File Complaint
in Intervention and Notice of Hearing" on Mr. Patterson's
former counsel and on counsel for Interstate.

(R. 1:112-115).

At the Ingersolls' request, their motion to intervene was heard
at the same time as Interstate's motion for summary judgment.
(R. 1:115; 1:205).
The Ingersolls were represented at the hearing on
their motion to intervene personally and through counsel.

The

Ingersolls should have been prepared to meet the obvious
objection that they already had been heard and had already lost
on the merits in the Salt Lake City Case.

Under the foregoing

circumstances, it is preposterous for the Ingersolls to claim
on appeal that they were somehow prejudiced or surprised that
Interstate, a sister company of Mountain Fuel, would raise the
defense that the Ingersolls had already had their day in court
regarding the Vacated Street Property.

Even if the lower court

erred in granting Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment
against the Ingersolls in the Salt Lake City Case (which, of
course, is not conceded), said Judgment is binding because the
Ingersolls did not take an appeal from that final Judgment "on
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the merits" entered against them in the Salt Lake City Case.
(R. 11:242).
The Ingersolls' claim of surprise is further undercut
by their own inattention to the matter subsequent to the
hearing May 5, 1986 before Judge Fischler. At the hearing,
counsel for the Ingersolls claimed that he lacked knowledge of
the Salt Lake City Case and even proposed to submit a posthearing memorandum on the matter.

(R. 1:207).

At the end of

the hearing, Judge Fischler took the matter under advisement.
(R. 1:221).

Judge Fischler did not enter his minute order

until more than two months later, on or about July 28, 1986.
(R. 1:144).

At no time between the May 5, 1986 hearing and the

July 28, 1986 minute entry did the Ingersolls submit (or ask
permission to submit) any post-hearing supplemental memorandum
(or affidavits) addressing the res judicata and collateral
estoppel arguments raised by Interstate.
As the terms are generally used, res judicata refers
to claim preclusion, whereas collateral estoppel refers to
issue preclusion.

The reason Interstate argued both collateral

estoppel and res judicata below, and continues to argue both
theories on appeal, is that both doctrines apply to support the
lower court's refusal to allow the Ingersolls to intervene.
In Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873
(Utah 1983) Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous court,
explained the distinction and relationship between res judicata
and collateral estoppel as follows:
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The doctrine of res judicata is two branches with
somewhat different rules governing each branch,
although both branches basically serve the
important judicial policy, among others, of
preventing issues once litigated from being
relitigated. [Citation omitted]. One branch,
claim preclusion, bars the relitigation by the
parties or their privies of a claim for relief
that was once litigated on the merits and
resulted in a final judgment between the same
parties or their privies. [Citations omitted].
The same rule also prevents relitigation of
claims that could and should have been litigated
in the prior action but were not. [Citations
omitted].
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
prevents the relitigation of issues that have
been once litigated and determined in another
action even though the claims for relief in the
two actions may be different. [Citations omitted]
669 P.2d at 874-75 (citations omitted).

In Searle Bros, v.

Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court
said:

"The legal definition of a person in privity with

another, is a person so identified in interest with another
that he represents the same legal rights.

This includes a

mutual or successive relationship to rights in real property."
The doctrine of res judicata bars the Ingersolls'
proposed complaint in intervention because the causes of action
asserted in the Ingersolls' proposed complaint in intervention
in this case are causes of action which "could and should have
been litigated" in the Salt Lake City Case, "but were not."
669 P.2d at 875.

Interstate concedes that the Ingersolls?

causes of action in the Salt Lake City Case were different from
the specific causes of action in the Ingersolls' proposed
complaint in intervention in this case.

However, since the

ownership of the Vacated Street Property was the central issue
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in the Salt Lake City Case, this Court should apply the
doctrine of res judicata to bar the Ingersolls' proposed
complaint in intervention in this case.
At the very least, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
precludes the Ingersolls from relitigating the issue of their
ownership interest, if any, in the Vacated Street Property,
The motion for summary judgment filed by Interstatefs sister
company, Mountain Fuel, in the Salt Lake City Case brought into
issue the very question of whether the Ingersolls had any
right, title or interest in the Vacated Street Property.
Summary judgment was entered against the Ingersolls in the Salt
Lake City Case in favor of Mountain Fuel on the ownership issue
and no appeal was taken from that adverse ruling.

The

Ingersolls are estopped from relitigating the issue of their
ownership previously decided against them in the Salt Lake City
Case.

Even if the ruling against the Ingersolls in the Salt

Lake City Case was erroneous, it became permanently binding on
the Ingersolls by their voluntary election not to appeal from
that ruling.
Interstate is Mountain Fuel's "privie" for purposes of
this case because the two companies are affiliates and because
Mountain Fuel is Interstatefs successor to the Brewery Property
and the Vacated Street Property.

(R. 1:94).

The Ingersolls insist that at the very least they
should have been allowed to intervene in this case to litigate
their adverse possession claims.
Ingersolls1 Brief at 12.

See Mr. Patterson and the

However, as a matter of law, the
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Ingersolls are unable to plead a prima facie adverse possession
claim.

Under the Utah adverse possession statutes, the

Ingersolls would have to show that they have been adversely
possessing the Vacated Street Property continuously for seven
years immediately prior to May 5, 1986, the date of the hearing
on their proposed complaint in intervention.

The Ingersolls

allege in their proposed complaint in intervention that they
have been adversely possessing the Vacated Street Property
"from and after October of 1977."

(R. 1:122).

However, as a

matter of law, the Ingersolls could not have been occupying the
Vacated Street Property adverse to the interests of Interstate
(or its sister company and successor in interest, Mountain
Fuel) for that period of time.
Based on the pleadings filed by the Ingersolls in the
Salt Lake City Case, the Court can rule as a matter of law that
the Ingersolls cannot satisfy the seven year test.

For

example, in the amended complaint filed by the Ingersolls on or
about April 30, 1979 in the Salt Lake City Case, the Ingersolls
alleged that Mountain Fuel Supply Company was occupying the
Vacated Street Property to the exclusion and alleged detriment
of the Ingersolls.

(R. 11:151-157).

Furthermore, it was not

until September 10, 1982 that Judge Fischler signed the final
Judgment dismissing the Ingersolls' complaint in intervention
in the Salt Lake City Case "with prejudice on the merits."
11:242).

(R.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

Ingersolls, the most that can be said for the Ingersolls is
that from and after September 10, 1982 that they began their
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alleged period of adverse possession.

Since their proposed

complaint in intervention in this case was tendered less than
four years later, the Ingersolls were incapable of alleging a
prima facie cause of action for adverse possession.

Contrary

to the Ingersolls' assertions, nothing in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-13 (1953, as amended) (dealing with adverse possession
of public streets after they have been sold for valuable
consideration) alters the Ingersolls' need to hold for seven
years before seeking title by adverse possession.

Certainly

the lower court had no obligation to allow the Ingersolls to
intervene when the court could rule as a matter of law that the
Ingersolls could not plead a cause of action for adverse
possession capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court order
granting Interstatefs motion for summary judgment against Mr.
Patterson and the lower court's order denying the Ingersolls'
motion to intervene should be affirmed.
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Interstate Land Corporation to be mailed, postage prepaid,
this 3 D - day of December, 1987, to the following:
Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
Attorneys for R. D. Patterson,
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian
Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R.
Ingersoll and Evelyn E.
Ingersoll
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692

libJfr J O J ^
64960
122787
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™

flequcct ol B ^ ™ ! ! . ^ 5 . t i i g l & Title Company
KATIL I
Deputy

THIS TRUST DEED is cade this £

~~day of July, 1977, between

LEMEL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and MELVIN E. INCERSOLL and MARIAN
BEVERLY INCERSOLL, his wife, and LELANj R. INCERSOLL and EVELYN E. INCERSOLL,
his wife, as Trustors, all of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, BACKMAN ABSTRACT & TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and CENERAL BREWING COMPANY,
a California corporation, as Beneficiary.
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER
OF SALE, the following described property situated In Salt Lake County, State
of Utah:
PARCEL 1;

All of Block A3. Plat " C . Salt Lake City Survey.

PARCEL 2: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block A3,
Plat M C", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East A feet;
thence South 660 feet; thence West A feet to the Southeast corner
of Lot 1 of said Block A3; thence North 660 feet to the point of
beginning.
PARCEL 3: Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block A3, and
running thence West 99 feet; thence North 2A7.5 feet; thence West 163
feet, more or less, to the East Bank of the Jordan River; thence
Northerly along said East Bank to a point due West froa the Northwest
corner of said Block A3; thence East to the Northwest corner of said
Block A3; thence South 660 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL A; All of the South half of vacated Tirst South Street lying
between the West line of Clendale Street produced and' the East Bank of
the Jordan River*
PARCEL 5: Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block AA, Plat "C",
Salt Lake City Survey,and running thence North 10 rods; thence East
10 rods; thence South 10 rody; thence West 10 rods to the point of
beginning.
PARCEL 6: All of Lot 3, Block 1 # JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A, Plat
"C", Salt l~' e City Survey.
Together with the East half of vacated Clendale Street adjoining
on the ViT.t.
PARCEL 7: All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A,
Plat "C", S^lt Lake City Survey.
Together with the following described portion of vacated Clendale Street adjoining on the East: Commencing 82.5 feet North from the
Southeast c o m e r of Lot 1, Block 2, said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running
thence North 66 feet to the Northeast corner of said Lot 23; thence East
33 feet; thence South 33*A2V West 59.A8 feet to the point of commencement.
Together with the North one-half of vacated First South Street
adjoitiJt.j; on the South.
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING:
1.

An easement for vionstruction and maintenance of an underground conduit along
the following described line:

BEGINNING 45.23 feet Wc^i of the City Engineer's M O M X C M
on 10th West Street ar d 56 feet 'I^uth of City Engineer's
Monument on First South Street, ind running t^snee West
327.27 feet; as created in favor of Utah Power and Light
Conpany, a corporation, by instrument recorded November 18,
1916 as Entry No. 369708, Book 3-C, Page 218.
2.

Right of Way for a Railroad spur tract, said right of way being 8-1/2
feet on each side of, and measured at right angles to, the following
described center line:
BEGINNING at a point West All.* feet from the Southwest
corner of the Intersection of 10th West Street and First
South Street, running thence Southerly on a 15*30' curve
to the right * distance of 97.6 leet; thence Southerly on
a ta.i^ent to said curve 142.8 feet; thence on a 14* curve
to the left 172.2 feet to a point on the West line of 10th
West Street which point is North 113.3 feet from the North
line of Second South Street; as created in favor of the
Western Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation, by instrument
recorded June 27, 1921 as Entry No. 452855 in Book ll-l,
page 81.
By Agreement recorded September 9, 192i, Entry No. 542833 in Book 3-V,
page 573, said Western Pacific Railroai Company granted an easement and
right-of-way over a portion of above d iscribert tract to Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company.

3.

An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry No. 542834 in Book 3-W,
puge 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western
Pacific Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a
corporation, second party, which provides for relocation of present
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto.

4.

A perpetual easement for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to wit:
An irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions
of vacated First South Street (together with other property
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry No. 551852 in
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252.

5.

A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal
of a gas pipe line along the following described line:
BECINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running
West on First South Street, 15 feet South of the center line
thereof, to the Jordan F-.ver; as created in favor of Utah Gas
& Coke Company by instn.-aent recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry
No. 637186 in Book 44, Page 589 of Official Records.
A Pole Line Easement ovei tho. following described center line:
M

BECINNINC at a point S;».ith 89*53'22 West 470 feet
from a Monument at the intersection of First South
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0*12'22M
West 51 feet; thence North 89*58 , 22 u East 436.8 feet;
as created in favor of Utah Po^er and Light Company, a
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as
Entry No. 1009087 in P:>ok 434, Page 609 of Official
Records.

w
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A K 1 f;l L o f 1 I'".,: \ f <: i an 3 i i i c 11 • ".a t e i j: • 1 j: • c 1,11 * a 11 c i g t "ll'i c !'
" c 11 CA 11 ig cl c s c i 1 be d;
line:
B E C I W I N C at a p o i n t S o u t h 12 3L, i et: t.. a n d Eas t 1 i 36 f eet
from the Northwest co"ner of Scc11 on 2 , "I"ownship 1 South,
Range 1 W e s t , Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 83*10' East 155 feet; thence South 25*30*
East 85 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of I1.iter, recorded May 2 5 , 1 9 5 0 , as Entry No 1201.402 In
he j-ii 768, Page 266 of Official Records
i t u a 1 e a s c n c n t f o i a d r a i n a ge d i I < :h a 1 on ,g t h e i» o f t h s 1 d e o f W e 61
, South Street, together J'ith the right of the ( i *. y to enlarge said
as reserved by Salt Lake City In Instrument recorded September- 2 2 ,
H S Entry No. 343644 In Book 12 -H , page 524 oI" 0f • 'icia 1 Recc • r d <
• le Line Easement granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded
! ii i lary 1 6 , 1 9 U . In B o o k 1 7 7 " , P a g e 2 4 2 , Entry N o . 1 7 5 6 7 3 3 , O f f i c i a l
I o r d s , f o " *h.? c i e c t i o n and c o n t i n u e d m a i n t e n a n c e , r e p a i r , a l t e r a t i o n ,
ai id replaced '"-it of t h e e l e c t r i c t r a n s m i s s i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n and t e l e p h o n e
c i r c u i t s of" 11 e C r «• n t. e e a n d t w o an c h o x s a n dl 11 »i e e p o i e s a 1 on g a 1 i n e
described .»: "c j lens I
B E G I N S K** t a point vithin an existing transmission line »;"'! ilc'h
is 900 feet South and 1139 feet East, more or less,, from
the Northwest corner of Section 2 , Township 1 South, Range
1 V e s t , Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49' West 540 feet
J
on said land and being in 1-*'
.£.:*»
••* *

rciuiu* .
and rejl«*

* < ..cnt gi anted to Utah Power & "Light Company as recorded
• ., in Book 1773, Page 2 4 3 , Entry N o . 1756734, Official
e erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
of the electric transmission distribution and telephone
Grantee and one guy and 3 poles along a line described as

BEGINNING at a fence on the North 'boundary line ol the GrantoiB'
land at a point 845 feet South and 1170 feet East, more or less,
from the Northwest corner of Section 2 , Township 1 South, Range
1 V e s t , Salt Lake Moridian, thence South 0*02' Last 740 feet,
more or l e s s , to a fence on the South boundary line of Bald Idiid
and being In lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2 ,
11

Any other rights of way and easements for road"., ditches, canals,, utiJttirs,
pipe lines, e t c . , which n.iv r-«1st nv«»r undrr
i •iii-n,« i . HI 1 n 1.

ILK, £ 1111 I LI III ill building., (ixturub and imp i ovenem « thereon did all vitei ilRtts,,
rights-of ~u,i) , east'Dftiib, itniis, issues, p r u I I t H , 1 iw nit

tenements, heredlta 1 i-ntt*,

privilege b And appurtenances I. he re unto now oi hereatt-'i used "' enjoyed "if I 'i*MM
prope11 v

IIi a m nH I ( thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSF OF SECURING payment of tlit1 Indebtedness tvldi*nc .<<J In n

promissory note of even ddtn herewlil , in tht nr Ini lfi«i 1 sum of '> I ,300,0011 Uli, payable K *
CO
til the ordeii of Bene! t r i a l y si I I p I lines k In i lie mann* i «nd v 1 f lh i n h e r e s ' aa t h e r e i n
5
11 1

set

forth,

and pa\mcnl

of any sums expended ci .nly.iim i I hv Her* I I r l n v 1

p 1 1 e i 1 thej"***

o
s e c u r i t y hereof,

H^

-4,-

Trustor agrees to p/jy all

.axes and assessments

on thu above propi rty,

to pay all charp,«s and assessments on water or water stock. use«! on ct -.'ith sale'
property, not to commit waste, to maintain adequate fire insurance *>n improvements
on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collev.ion (including Trustee's
and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the Indebtedness secured
hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of rhi services performed by
Trustee hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof.
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default
and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbafore
set forth.

LEMEL CORPORATION

T/ll\*t? C\ i r C(L

MARIAK BEVERU^lNGERSQLl

LE^AND^R.

/j

I N G E R S O L L ^ T

EVELYN E. I N G E R S O L L ^

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake;
J
^..liiiMbftttthe 6 *~ day of C/^^Y
1977, personally appeared before me
AVfrXVX'l*. ItfSj&RSOLL, as President'and LELAND R. INGERSOLL, as Secretary of LEMEL
tjp&ORAtl^N, a Utah corporation, and each duly acknowledged to me that they
^exegut^d tne^foregoing Instrument on behalf of said corporation by authority of
\ a ^eaoJftiflpn of the board of directors of said corporation and that each acknowledged
» tf3 UJ^t'Ar said corporation executed the same and the seal affixed is the seal of

en
CD
/y
I'.; cobmlsslon expires

NOTARY gpSLIC

Residing at ^/ItCff*

{/~£/£r&7r

Q7*?Ff/

££
CD

-5-

S T . w l OF
C< J . ,

° T '• e & tJ~ oay °^ J^""
'j/LAJ
, A >,
- i s o n a i l y appeared b e f o r e
.. Jr.^XCUV^N L. INSERSOLi., MARIAN BEVtfkLY 1NCKRS0LL, hit- J i f e , and LELAND R. TKCERSOLL
/ ^ a n d EY£l/*U E, INCERSOLL, h i s w i f e , s i g n e r s of t h e • •unenc , who duly
* - ^ »cxn^ov/<)Ldf^d'.co me t h a t they executed t h e aame

Miv.c^i^^cton^xplres^ ^

'

% ^

/ 77 9

R e s i d i n g ai

£-,ll€/fT~//f£/6/ffmr

f'j/TM

Li

t:;

C"«i

c

SI I I E 01 I JTAII,

\

Cif> End County of Salt Lake1,

/

•
M. i 1 eh ( !. 1
1 1 ilj !;! ; r i i •
»•
certify that the d?ta< (•• = . lionitunJ *> i
ordinance
S

'..ratirr

** *
>v<h «c ret*

*; \ Cn<* 11 P =S - : *^ ;

•.

> j 0 u u l s t r e e t s wesc o i

JI
I

-- «

passed l»j flu1 Hoard id Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, .
as appears

'-

October

5,

• 1^7 7

'MM *

IN MI1NKSS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said
City, this
(SEAL)

21st

. day of

' .

December

. ... 1978—.

City Recorder

AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE VACATING Glendaie and First South
Streets west of MOO West Street
located in Salt Lake C«tv. Utah
Be It ordained by the Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake
d r y . Utah
SECTION 1 That Glendale
and First South Streets west of
MOO West Street located in Salt
Lake City, Utah, more particularly described as follows, be.
and the same hereby is. vacated and declared no longer to
be public property for use as a
street, svtr%ut. alley or pedestrian way
Beginning at the Southeast
corner of Lot I. Block I. Jones'
Subdivision, Block 54. Plat " C " .
Salt Lake City Survey, said
point also being the Northwest
corner of 1100 West and First
South Streets, and running
thence South a 2' S3" East
132 17 feet, thence West 334 00
leet. thence North 0* 00 55''
West 214 63 feet to me North
east corner of Lot 1, Block 2,
said Jones' Subdivision, thence
North XT 42 East 59 4* feet,
thence East 36 00 feet to me
Northwest corner of Lot 2,
Block 1. said Jones' Subdivision, thence South 132 00 feet,
mence East 264 00 feet to point
Of beginning Contains 51,433 32
souare feet, or 1 190 acres
Said vacation Is made expressly subiect to all existing
rights of way and easements of
all public utilities of any and
every description now located
on. In. under or over the
confines of the above described
property, and also subiect to
the rights of entry thereon for
the purpose of maintaining,
altering, repairing, replacing,
removing or rerouting said
utilities and ail of them
SECTION 2 This ordinance
shall take eHect 30 days after
its first publication
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 5th day of October,
1977.
T E D L WILSON
Mayor
M I L D R E D V MIGHAM
City Recorder
(SEAL)
BILL NO 173 of 1977
Published October IS. 1977
(B-6)

bxniDii

my& svbtc. £<c wi
331)3351
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SUBSTITUTION OF TKUSTLL
RXCHAiiii L, BLANUv,
hereby appointed

a memliei

successor

Trustee

Jl

6*

ill i Ll nil

under

that

intt*

cei . a i n

Li:ir „ i a

y>

^

K

^^

v\ h• 7j -

Deed of

i,

executed

b> iiMLL CORPORATION,

INGEKSOLL a n d / B E V E R L Y
t >*

fNGEKSOU,,

BACKMAN ABSTRACT i TITLE
S a i d Deed of
recoidid
115 c l o t

.lull,

JII

the* r e c o r d s of

to certain

the Sail

No,

mote p a r t i c u l a r l y

described

XI

l»i

)H

;9 7 H I 0

above

in S a l t
as

"

\
fl

uni

4.

s

\

I

AS Ttuf. l e e .
was

in B ok. 4519 a t

Lake l o u n l y

located

*> \d, ,
Hj

namen

Trust, d e s c r i b e d

re A J | i i r o p e r t y #

HLLV1MI

n I I e » LEI AND R. INGERSOLL IfJ A

is dated July

as E n t r y

Corp< I at Ion»

I
-ihi Ii C J M I ' M BREWING
i • hamtil a s Bt e t i c i a r y and

COMPANY i s

Trust

I'll

Thv lif i i' ,J

'Utah,

lil'i

iN K INGERSOLL, ll L w i l t
a laLilornia coi^oratioii

.

a Utah

y

Page

Recoider.
i s ma^1

<t I • I

i*ake C i u i a t y ,

lolinwi,,

no

respect

State

of

wit:

ATTACHMENT

SEE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this
1

1

j '" / '. ,v day of August, 1979.
GENERAL BREWING COMPANY

Carl E, Mullen, *r/A

* c;-

^K^ ,

P . , $#c*tary

-;.v / /

CO

o
•-

^. -'

Washington

STATE OF
COUNTY ~T

m&mtii
Clark
1>«r nonia 1 i y

before

-

' w i r L L - M w l l c n . Jl%

w h o be 1 n 9 by mi i! 111 \
1

*'"*" M "

ajipif ai ecu

1

m w n i' n i d i

each

tl'.fl 1.1 id

ll. IIM)
n nd I n a t

t o r h i m s H 11.. tJi .ii l II ici ,.

L* U'« M ^ ^ j t i x L a J U L - . . - » •", "l"'"f"

Carl I... H u l l e n . J r .

,, BRHMiNG (JOflP ANY,

in a"

r, h •

Of GENERAL

11 V n m n a 11 ! I r e a o i incj i n s t r ume n i

-1-

A

i i II

yt i

signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution
of its Board of Directors, and maid
and _ _

Carl E. Mullen, Jr.

each duly acknowledged to me that

said „corporation executed the same and that th<? sr*al affixed is
...••fK^'^p^l ofc uaid corporation*

Residing at:
My»Cqpwfis3ion Expires:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
A copy of the foregoing Substitution of Trustee
acknowledged *o received this

m

7 ~~~ day of

mfgJll72frl6<2S~

1979.
BACKMAN ABSTRACT 6 TITLE COMPANY

^^J^^rfSttoP*^
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

tye&i

)
)
)

ss«

FlSti&Z.

f being on oath first duly sworn

Acting for and on behalf of 0&H4(2b

deposes and says:

LSlAAlCJi

Trustee, I caused a copy to be mailc-d by registered mail, postage
prepaid, deposited with United States Mail, Salt Lake City, Utah,
this

7*^

day of

, 1979, addressed to

each of the following:
LeMel Corporation
Brewery Mall Division
1100 West Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Melvln E. Xngersoll
7»:6 West 1300 South
St.lt Lake City, Utah

84104

Beverly In.jorrfo
766 West 1300 Sou
S a l t Lake C i t y , Ut.-<

41u«

Leiand K. Ingeraoll
1200 South 700 Weet
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

Ml'fi

Evelyn E. I n g e r s o l l
1200 South 700 West
S a l t Lake City, Utah

84 J im

ife

3

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
County of Salt Lake )

ss«

Lorraine Wood

t

being duly sworn upon oath,

deposes and says:
1.

That she is employed by Ray, Quinney 6 Nebeker as

a secretary;
2.

That on the JJ^^day

of October, 1979, she per-

sonally deposited in the United States mails, by registered mail,
postage prepaid, copies of the herein Substitution of Trustee
to the following persons, being at least all those persons having
requested copies of any notice of default or notice of sale
affecting the real property described in said Substitution of
Trustee, as required by Utah Code Annotated Sections 57-1-22 and
57-1-26.
Fibro Company
c / o William A. S o u v a l l I I
3686 West 2100 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84120
Smith's Management Corporation
1550 South Redvood Road
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
DATED t h i s

fl

% day of October,

1979.

Subscribed and sworn t o before mo t h i s t t ^

^Coifc&loh

Expirest

day of

/ c <

.

Exhibit D

NOTICE OF DEFAULT

3334045
NOT1CF. IS HEREBY GIVEN:

That RICHARD L. BLANCK is

Trustee under a Deed of Trust dated July 6, 1977, executed by
LeMel Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll and
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, Leiand R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E.
Ingersoll, his wife, in which General Brewing Company, *
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman
Abstract & Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18,
1977, as Entry No, 2971310, in Book 4519, at Page 1159, of
Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt
Laxe County, Utah, describing land therein a s :
SEE ATTACHMENT
Said obligations include a note in the principal sum of
$1,800,000.00.
A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which
such deed is security has occurred in that payments due on August
1, 1979 and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of $55,316.66,
have not beed paid.
By reason of such default, Richard L. Blanck, as
Trustee, and General Brewing Company, as Beneficiary, under said
Deed of Trust, do hereby declare all sums secured thereby immediately due &nd payable and have elected and do hereby elect to
cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
secured thereby.
DATED this 7th day of September.
RICHARD L. BLANCK, Trustee
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

)

8S.

On this 7th day of September, personally appeared betore
me Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice of
Defa'u'ijtJ? vtep duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

\ \\
\

•••<•
\^UBL^-

j- • •
;

'Mj^&jwi^ajHon ^xpires s

*/W0o

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing ?.n Salt Lake County, Utah

By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 542833 In Boob 3-V,
page 573, aald Western Pacific Kailroad Company granted an aascment and
right-of-vay over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short
Line Kailroad Company.
3.

An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry Mo. 542834 In Boob 3-W,
psge 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Kailroad Co. and The Western
Pacific Kailroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a
corporation, aecond party, vhich provides for relocation of present
trackage and construction of additional trackage In accordance with a
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto.

4.

A perpetual aasement f or the aoit and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line
Kailroad Company and the Western Pacific Kailroad Company for a Kight of
Way for their present apur tracks over the following described land, to vit:
An Irregular traet of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions
of vacated First South Street (together vith other property
not covered by this deed) more particularly described In
instrument retarded January 20, 1926 as Entry Ko. 551852 In
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252.

5.

A Kight of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal
of a gas pipe line along the following described line:
BEGINNING at the West line of 10th West Street, and running
West on First South Street, 15 feet Sovth of the center line
thereof, to the Jordan Kiver; as created in favor of Utah Cas
4 Coke Company by Instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry
No. 637166 in Book 44, Par* 569 of Official Kecords.

6.

A Polt Line Easement over the following described enter line:
BEGINNINC at a point South 69*58 9 22 M West 470 feet
from a Monument at the intersection of Flrat South
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0 W 12'22"
West 51 feet; thence North 69*58'22" East 43*.8 feet;
as created in favor of Utah Power and Light Company, a
corporation, by instrument recoxded August 23, 1945, as
Entry No. 1009087 In Book 434,*l'age 609 of Official
Kecords.

7.

A Kight of Way for a 3 Inch water pipeline along the following described
line:
BEGINNING at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South,
Kange 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 63*10* East 155 feet; thenca South 25*30*
E*st 65 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of Water, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201402 in
Book 768, Page 266 of Official Ktcords.

8.

A perpetual casement for a drainage ditch along the North aide of West
First South Street, together with the right of the City to enlarge aald
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City In instrument recorded September 22,
1925, as Entry No. 543644 in Book 12-B, page 524 of Official Ktcorda.

9.

A Pole Line Easement granted to Utah Power 4 Light Company as recorded
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 242, Entry No. 1736733, Official
Kecords, for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of the Crantee and tvo anchori and three poles along a lint
described ^ follows:
BEGINNING at a point within an existing transmission line vhich
is 900 faat South and 1139 feet East, mora or less, from
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Kange
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49* West 540 faat
cm aald land and being In Lota 3 and 6 of «fid Section 2.

if)

H
Co

A Folt Lint Easement granted to Utah Fovtr a Light Coapany at recorded
January 16, 1961, In look 1773, fage 243, Entry Mo. 17*673*. Official
fcecorde, for tht artetlon and continued nainttnanct, repair, alteration,
and rcplactatnt of tht altctrlc trantalttlon distribution and telephone
cireuitt of tht Grant at and ent guy and 3 poltt along a lint described at
follows:
IEC1NNINC at a fence on tht llorth hound try lint of tht Grant era'
land at a point 145 fttt South and 1170 fttt East, aort or lost,
froa tht Northvtst corner of Section 2, Tovnshlp 1 South, Range
1 Vest, Salt Lata Meridian, thence South 0*029 Eatt 740 fttt.
•ore or less, to a ftnet en tht South boundary lint of atld land
and being In Lota 3 and 6 of said Section 2.
Any other rights of vay and eateaentt for roads, ditches, canals, utilities,
pipe lines, etc*, which »sy exist over, under or across said land.

Exhibit E
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oor 4 1 1 0

NOTICE OF DEFAULT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVENt

>*f

That RICK/AD L. BLANCK is Suc-

cessor Trustee under a Deed of Trust dated July 6, 1977, executed by
LeMel Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll and Marian
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, Leiand R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, his wife, as Trustors, in which Gener<<3 Brewing Company, a
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman Abstract
6 Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18, 1977, as
Entry No. 2971310, in Book 4519, at Pagi. 1159, of Official Records
in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt Laks 'Jour-.y, Utah, describing land therein at:
SEE ATTACHMENT
Said RICHARD L. BLANCK was substituted as Trustee under said
Deed of Trust by a substitution of Trustee dated the 31st day of
August

, 1979 and recorded

as Entry No,

3353351

in Book

October 19

, 1979,
at Page

of tho Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of
Salt Lake County, Utih*
The obligations for which the trust property was conveyed
as security include a note in the principal sum of $1,800,000.00.
A breach of, and default xn, the obligations for which said Deed of
Trust is security has occarred in that payments due on Auoust 1, 1979
and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of $55,316.66, have not
been paid.

A further breach of, and default in, the covenants con-

tained in said Deed of Trust has occurred in that the Trustors have not
paid 1977 General Property Taxes or 1978 General Proparty Taxes,
causing the above-described secured land to be sold by a Tax Sale to
Salt Lake County.
By reason of such defaults, Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee,
and General Brewing Company, aa Beneficiary, under said Deed of Trust,

•&>

do hereby declare all sums secured thereby Immediately due and pay-

2
CD

able and have alcctod and do hereby elect to cauae the truat property
to be sold to aatlafy the obligations secured thereby.
DATED thla^J} 3»day of October, 157 9.

RICHARD L. BLANCK, Trustee

STATE OP UTAH

)
) «a

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On thisZZhd

day of October, 1979, personally appeared

before me RICHARD L. BLANCK, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice of
Default, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

fcV*- r :
\^.OBVN%/
ffijpCffi&sXbn Expires:

NOXAR*PUBLIC-, JT / J
Residing! \JJt/A %*Aj
fo.

-2-

T7T/
6&/U\

PAECEL If

All of Block 43, flat "C", Salt Lake City Survey.

PARCEL 2: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block A3,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survty, and running thence East 4 feet;
thence South 660 feet; thence Veat 4 fact to the Southxaet corner
of Lot 1 of eald Block 43; thence Worth 660 feet to the point of
beginning.
PARCEL 38 Beginning at tha Southwest corner of said Block 43. and
running theme Veat 99 feet; thence Xoftb 247*3 feet; thence Vest 163
feet, sore or leaa9 to the Cast Bank of the Jordan ftlver; thence
northerly along said East Bank to a point due Veat ft on the Northwest
corner of aaid Block 43; thence East to the Northwest comer of aaid
Block 43; thence South 660 feet to the point of beginning.
PAKCEL 4; All ©f the South half of vacated ttret South Street lying
between the Vest lint of CIendele Street produced and* the Eaet Bank of
the Jordan River*
PARCEL 3; Commencing at the Southwest toner of Block 44, Plat t, C M t
Salt Lake City Survey.end running thence North 10 roda; thence East
20 rods; thence South 10 roda; thence Vest 10 roda to the point of
beginning.
PAECEL 6t All of Lot 3, Block 1, JOKES SUBDIVISION of Block 34, Plat
"C", Salt Lake City Survey.
Together vlth tha Eaat half of vacated CI end ale Street adjoining
on the Vest.
PAECEL 7t All of Lota 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 34,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey*
Together vlth tha following deacrlbed portion of vacated Clendele Street adjoining oa tht Easts Commeoeiog 82.3 feet North froa the
Southeast comer of Lot 1, Block 2, aaid JONES SUBDIVISION, and running
thence Korth 66 feet to the Northeast comer of aaid Lot 23; thence East
33 fttt; thence South 33*42* Vest 39.48 feet to the point of commencement.
Together vlth tht North one-half of vacated rivet South Street
adjoinioj; oa the South*
SUBJECT TO THE POLLOVZNC:
1.

An eeaeacot for cone t met ion and maintenance of an underground conduit along
the following described line!
BEGINNING 45.23 feet Vest of the City Engineer's Monument
on 10th Veat Street and 36 feet South of City* Engineer 'a
Monument on First South Street* and running thence Vest
327.27 feet; at created in favor of Utah Power and Light
Company, a corporation, by instrument recorded November 18.
1916 as Entry No. 369208, Book 3-C, l»age 228.

2*

JUght of Vay for a Kailroad ef>ur tract* aaid right of vay being 8-1/2 '
feet on each aide of, and measured at right anglea to, the following
deacrlbed center line!
BEGINNING at a point Veat 411.3 feet froa the Southwest
comer of the Intersection of 10th Vast Street and First
South Street, running thence Southerly cm a 15*30* curve
to tha right a distance of 97.6 feet; thence gouthcrly cm
a tangent to said curve 142.8 feat; thence on a 14* curve
to tha left 172.2 feet to a point on the Vait line of 10th
Vast Street vtiich point le North 113.3 feet frrm the North
line of Second South Street; ae created in favor of the
Vtittm Pacific Hail road Company, c corporation, by instrument
recorded June 27, 1921 aa Entry ft». 432633 in Book 11-2,
page 81.

By Agreement recorded September f, 1923, Entry Ho. 542833 in look 3-V,
page 373t oald Vaatarn Pacific Railroad Company granted an eattmsnt and
right-of-way ovar a portion of above described tract to Oragoo Short
Line Railroad Company.
An Agreement racordad September 9 # 1925 aa Entry Mo. 542134 in Book 3-V,
page 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co* and The Western
Pacific Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a
corporation, aecond party, which provldaa for relocation of present
trackage and construction of additional trackage In aecordanca with a
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto.
A perpetual easement for the tola and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of
Way for their preaent apur tracke ever the following described land, to wit:
An Irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, D o c k 43,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain yortione
of vacated First South Street (together with other property
mot covered by this deed) sore particularly described in
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry Mo. 551(52 in
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252.
A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal
of a gas pipe line along the following described line:
BEGINNING at tht West lint of 10th West Street, and rvnnlng
West on First South Stiitet, 15 feet South of the center line
thereof, to tht Jordan River; at created in favor of. Utah Cas
ft Coke Coapsny by instrument recorded July 27, 194?, as Entry
No. 637166 in Book 44, Paga 589 of Official Records.
A Pole Line Easement ovar the following described center line:
BEGINNING at a point South B9°5S'22H West 470 feet
from a Monument at tht intersection of First South
and Clendale Streeta, and running thence South 0°12'22"
West 51 feet; thenct North B9*5B'22M East 436.1 feet;
aa created in favor of Utah Power and Light Company, a
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as
Entry No. 1009087 in Booh 434,- Page 409 of Official
Records.
A Right of Way for a 3 Inch vatar pipeline along the following described
lint:
BEGINNING at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 83*10* East 155 feet; thenca South 25*30*
East 65 fast, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of Water, recorded May 25, X950, as Entry No. 1201402 in
Book 768, Pagt 266 of Official Records.
A perpetual tasement for a dralntgt ditch along tht North aldt of West
First South Strtet, togtthtr with tha right of tht City to anltrgt said
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lakt City la instrument recorded September 22,
1925, at Entry Ho. 543644 la Book 12-H, page 524 of Official Records.
A Pole Lint Easement grtnttd to Utah Power ft Light Company me recorded
January 16, 1961, la Book 1773, Pagt 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official
Records, for tht erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteretlon,
and replseement of tht altctrle transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of tht Grantee and two anchors and three poles along a line
described as follows!
BEGINNING at a point within an exist leg transmission line which
la 900 feet South and 1139 feet Eaat, more cr leas, from
tha Northwest corner of Section 2, Townahlp 1 South, Range
1 Weat, Salt Lake Merldlen, thence South 6*49* Wast 540 feet
on aald land and being In Lots 3 and 6 of oald Section 2.

10.

A Felt Lint Cessment granted to Utah Fover ft Light Cosptny at rtcordtd
Janutry 16, 1*61, In Book 1773, F M e 241. totry Ho. 1756714, ©fiieitl
JUcordt. for the aractioa and ccmtlnutd atinttntnet. reptlr, alteration^
and rtpltctvent of tht altctrle transmittion dlttrlbution and telephone
cireuitt of tht Cranttt and one guy and S polet along a lint described at
followst
1CCINKXKC at'a fence on tht Worth hound try lint of tht Grantors9
land at a point S43 fttt South and 1170 fatt Sett. »ort or less,
froa the Horthvttt comer of Section 2, Tovnthip 1 South, fttngt
1 Vest. Salt Laha Meridian, thtnct South 0 # 02 9 Lett 740 fttt.
•ore or lest, to a ftnct on tht South boundary line of atid land
and htlng In Lota 3 and 6 of atid Section 2.

XI*

Any othtr xightt of wsy and eateatate for rotds. ditches, ctnslt. utilities,
pipe linet, a t e , which mty exist over, isndtr or across stld land.
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Moil tax notice to..

Pace

/..

^.S.^S«ri

Ref.

.Address..

3431368

QUIT CLAIM DEED

MELVIN E. INGERSOLL and MARIAN BEVERLY TCERSOUL. h i s w i f e , and
LELAND R. INGERSOLL and EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, h i s w i f e .
of
S a l t Lake C i t y
, County of S a l t Lake
QUIT CLAIM
to liMEL CORPORATION.

of
?%\^
.
,
.^"fof"otKr"i^"a^"vaIuaXIe*c5KI3efationT
tl »e lollowi11* described tract of I widln
State of Uvih to wit:

trmntors
, State of Utah, hereby

for the sum of
DOLLARS
Sale Lake
Cennty.

/

/&.

to

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO

WITNESS the hand

of said c a n t o r

, ih

0

STATE OF tJTAH.
County of
On the

S a l t Lake

#/ v '.> v \
*7->A

day of

May

W 80,
personally appeared before me

CD

H7.VIN E. EEERSOLL and MARIAN BEVERLY INGERSOLL. his wife, and LELAM/R';- ".J'"'" ' =r
INCKR90LL and EVELYN E. INCERSOLL, his wife
"•••.'/ * .* £
the signers
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t he y executed the'sa'nie.
^*»

i . . . .«..-

My eornminsion expires

r3:$3...

r »1C r :

Notary Public, resu'inp
Salt I^ike C l t v . Utah

T H I « nrto raiNTCo c«^cr«*LL« roa i*MOTo-MCCOAOiNa. use ei>c« ****. * N O T V H

SCHEDULE "A"

Parcel 1;
QZ^"^^"
All of Block 43, Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey.

*^

Parcel 2:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 43,
Plat MC", Salt Laktr City Survey, and running thence
CJH"*!'~
East 4.0 feet; thence So-ith 660.C feet: thence Jest
4.C feet to the Southeast corner of Lot i of said Block
43; thence North 660.0 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel 3:
BEGINNINC at the Southwest corner of said BlocJ' 43, and
running thence Vest 99.0 feet; thence North 247.5 feet;
thence West 163.0 feet, core or less, to the East Bank ^
of the Jordan River; thence Northerly along said East
Bank to a point due West fron the Northwe*t corne- of
said Block 43; thence East to the Northvcst corner of
said Block 43; thence South 660.0 feet to the point
of beginning.

/
,'

s
k^o3>~*~^-*'

4
Parcel 4:
All of the South half of vacated FiTst South StTeet lying tS&l-j££,7-/4
| between th* list line of Clendale Street produced and the
[East Bank of the Jordan River.

Parcel 5;
'
COMMENCING at the Southwest corner of Block 44, Plat "C\
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods;
thence East 10 rods; thence South 10 rods; thence West
10 rods to the point of beginning.
Parcel 6;
All of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54,
Plat "C", Salt lake City Survey.
^^-y„>UCj

^f/e/-Z/8~

J

*<~

TOGETHER WITH the East half of vacated Clendale Street
adjoining on the West
Parcel 7;
,,
•"
' All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54 , j Q f £ / - 2 6
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey,
"
TOGETHER WITH the following described portion of vacated Clendale
Street adjoining en the East:

-2
CO.1 MENCINC 82.5 feet North from the Southeast c o m e r of
Lot 1. Block 2, said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running
thence North 66.0 feet to the Northeast corner of said
Lot 23, thence East 33.0 feet; thence South 33*42* West
59.48 feet to the point of commencement.

I
t

1.

TOCETHER WITH the North one-half of vacated First South
Street adjoining on the South.
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING:

An easement for construction and maintenance of an underground conduit
along the following described line:
BECINNINC 45.23 feet West of the City Engineer's Monument
on 10th West Street and 56 feet South of City Engineer's
/"*^/-'//~/3
Monument on First South Street, and running thence West
--^
327.27 feet; as created in favor of Utah Power and Light
Company, a corporation, by Instrument recorded November 18,
1916 as Entry No. 36920b, Book 3-C, Page 218.

2.

Right of Way for a Railroad spur tract, said rlfcht of way being 8-1/2
feet on each side of,'and measured at right angles to, the following
described center line:
BECINNINC at a point West 411.5 feet from the Southwest
corner of the ^Intersection of 10th West Street and First
South Street 7'running thence Southerly on a 15*30' curve jCzH-H)'
to the right t distance of 97.6 feet; thence Southerly c n ^ ^
a tangent to said curve 142.8 feet; thence on a 14* curve
t* the left 1 7 ^ ^ feet to a point on the West line of 10th
West Stre£?jBjtfh point is North 113.3 feet from the North
line of Se~€oftd~ "South Street; as created in favor of the
Western Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation, by instrument
recorded June 27, 1921 mt Entry Vo. 452855 in Book 11-1,
page 81.

'*"J

By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 542833 In Book 3-V,
page 573, *miA, IjgfrLfflF^*'*4**'* Railroad Company granted an easement and
right-of-way over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short
Line X2flrohad Company.
3.

An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry No. 542834 in Book 3-V,
page 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western
Pacific Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a
. ,r
corporation, second party, which provides for relocation of present G 2 * l " •'*•tracka^e^and construction of additional trackage In accordance with a
plat marked Schedule "A" attached thereto.

4.

A perpetual casement for the sola anrt exclusive use of Oregon Short Lint
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to vlt:
•/

5.

An Irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions
of vacated First South Street (together with other property
.
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in C ^ M " " *
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry No. 551852 In
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252.

_

^
'
O
.^ J*J
'V
j?
^

A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal
of a gas pipe line along the following described line:

£?

BECINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running £^'f-*/l~ /7
Wect on First South Street, 15 feet South of the center line pv^ - --?->£
thereof, to the JoTdan River; as r eated in favor of Utah Cas ^ o « ^ ~ ' ^~
4 CoVe Company by instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry
No. 637186 in Book 44, Page 569 of Official Records.

-36.

A Pole Line Ensement over the following described center linr:

(ill ffP
I '
y BEC1MK1HC at a point South 89*58*22 M Vest 470 feet
~^*^
A
Irs//
* Cs'-.ty/t^i.
from a Monument at the intersection of First South
£ j Q ;» -7 — ?<\
and Clendale
#
'
~ '
' *J O'*'
Streets, and running thence South 0 12'22" ^ ^ 3
/- /.-/*< *
'
<' w cst 51 feet; thence Korth 89*58 , 22" East 436.8 feet;
•*"
as crr.atei* in favor of Utah Power and Light Company, a
r\/ .y/f
»/•/{/ ^I corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as
.-r //t.
*•
j E n t r y N o # J009087 in Book 434, Page 609 of Official
,fr Si ~J
Records.
/"
A Right of Vay for a 3 inch water pipeline along the following described
line:

J
t)

.^
''

,:'-"
'

\

i

BECINNINC at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, To.-nship 1 South, o —
* ^ ,,
Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
X?S2>~ ' * ^ 1
thence South 83*10' East 155 feet; thence South 25*30'
East 85 feet, as dltclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of Vatsr, recorded Kay 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201*02 in
Book 768, Page 266 of Official Records.

8. A perpetual easement for a drainage ditch along the North side of Vest
First South Street, together with the right of the City to enlarge said
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in Instrument recorded September 22,
1925, as Entry No. 543644 in Book 12-H, page 524 of Official Records.
9.

*
.^
•?• •' .
•^ . '"
.
v

10.

A Pole Line Easement granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official
Records, for the erection and continued caintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of the Grantee and two anchors and three poles along a line
described as follows:
BECIKNINC at a point within an existing transmission lint which
is 900 feet South and 1139 feet East, more or less, from
the Northwest corner of Section 2 , Township 1 South, Range .J^Q2r~l~
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49' Vest 540 feet
on said land and being In Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.
A Pole Line Easement granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official
Records, for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution an<? telephone
circuits of the Grantee and one guy and 3 poles a l o n g Y line described as
follows:
.
\
BECIKNINC at a fence on the North boundary line of the Crantora'
land at a point 845 feet South and 1170 feet East, more or less,
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 0*02' East 740 feet,
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of said land
and being in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.
&S3-7*""-33

11.

-

Any other rights of vay and easements for roads, ditches, canals, utilities!
pipe lines, etc., which nay exist over, under or across said land.
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Exhibit G

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

In re:

No. 80-00755

LEMEL CORPORATION,

ORDER WITH RESPECT TO
TRUSTEE'S INTENT TO
SELL REAL PROPERTY

Debtor.

A hearing was held before the Honorable Ralph R.
Mabey, United States Bankruptcy J u d g e , on the 24th day of
"
u

?2
**

0 * -< w
a

< j i

iVA

V „ 5 k-

May, 1 9 8 2 , at 5:15 p . m . in connection with objections to the
N o t i c e of T r u s t e e ' s Intent to Sell Real Property. T h e
T r u s t e e , N A C M Intermountain, Inc., w a s represented by
H e r s c h e l J. S a p e r s t e i n and W e s t o n L . Harris of the firm of
Watkiss & Campbell; Salt Lake City Corporation was repre-

<

£5

sented by J u d y F. Lever; M o u n t a i n Fuel Supply Company was
represented b y J a m e s S. Lowrie of the firm of J o n e s , Waldo,
H o l b r o o k & M c D o n o u g h ; and Roger Segal of the Firm of Cohne,
Rappaport & Segal represented General Brewing Company.
H e r s c h e l J. S a p e r s t e i n , counsel for T r u s t e e , represented to
the Court that it w a s the T r u s t e e ' s intention to sell all the
real p r o p e r t y in w h i c h the Debtor held an interest and that
the p r o p e r t y d e s c r i p t i o n in the T r u s t e e ' s Notice had erron e o u s l y o m i t t e d d e s c r i b i n g certain contiguous portions of
vacated First South Street west of 1100 West Street and
G l e n d a l e Street north of First South Street in which the,
estate m a y h a v e an interest.

Counsel for the Trustee further

represented that the proposed sale by the Trustee of the
estate's interest in such vacated property would be subject
to the interest claimed by Salt Lake City Corporation as set
forth in Case No. 78-7764 pending in the Third Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah in" Salt Lake County,
styled Salt Lake City v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, et
al., and that all parties that had indicated an interest in
bidding on the real property owned by the estate had been
notified of the claim of Salt Lake City.

The Court having

considered the Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Real
Property and the further representations of Trustee's counsel
in connection therewith, together with the Objection to
Trustee's Intention to Sell Property of Salt Lake City
Corporation, and the Court having determined that the
requirements of notice and hearing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363
had been met, it is hereby
ORDERED that NACM Interraountain, Inc., the Trustee,
be and it hereby is authorized to sell the real property of
the debtor in accordance with the terms of the Notice of
Trustee's Intent to Sell Real Property of the Estate filed
with the Court together with representations of Trustee's
counsel.

Said real property consists of the complex at

approximately 1100 West 200 South, including the estate's
interest in those contiguous portions of vacated First South
Street west of 1100 West and Glendale Street north of First
South Street, all of which property is located in Salt Lake
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more particularly
described as follows:

PARCEL •(?. 1;
All of Block U3, Plat " C % Salt Lake City Survey

PARCEL 10, 2,
B e g i n n i n g a t t h e N o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of Lot 8, Block H3, P l a t
"C", S a l t Lake City Survey and r u n n i n g t h e n c e East U f e e t ;
t h e n c e S o u t h 660 f e e t ; t h e n c e West 1 f e e t t o the Southeast
c o r n e r of Lot 1 of s a i d Block 4 3 ; t h e n c e North 660 f e e t
t o the p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g .
PARCEL MO. V*
Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block ^3, and
running thence West 99 feet; thence North 2^7.5 feet; thence
West 163 feet, more or less, to the East bank of the Jordan
River; thence Northerly along said East bank to a point
due West from the Northwest corner of said Block K3; thence
East to the Northwest corner of said Block 13; thence South
660 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL MO. »:
A l l of t h e S o u t h h a l f of v a c a t e d F i r s t South S t r e e t l y i n g
between t h e West l i n e of G l e n d a l e S t r e e t produced and t h e
East Bank of the Jordan R i v e r .
PARCEL WO. 5 :
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block ^ , Plat "C",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods;
thence East 10 rods: thence South 10 rods; thence Vest
10 rods to the point or beginning.
PARCEL MO. 6:
a l l of Lot 3 , Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5*. P l a t
"C", S a l t Lake City Survey.
Together

with the

e a s t h a l f of v a c a t e d G l e n d a l e

a d j o i n i n g on t h e West.

Street

A H of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block
5*, Plat mC*t Salt Lake City Survey.
Together with the following described portion of vacated
Glendale Street adjoining on the East; Commencing; 8 2.5
feet North from the Southeast corner of Lot 1, * 1 O C K <:,
said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running thence North 6b reet
to the Northeast corner of said Lot 23; thence East 33
feet; thence South 3 3 # * 2 ' West 59.*8 feet to the point
of commencement.
Together with the North one-half of vacated First South
Street adjoining on the South.
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS OF WAY AND EASEMENTS AND INTERESTS;

1.

An Easement for construction and maintenance of an underground
conduit along the following described line:
Beginning
45.23 feet Vest of the City Engineer's monumnet on 10th
Vest Street and 56 South of Gity Engineer's monument on
First South Street, and running thence Vest 327.27 feet,
as created in favor of Utah Power & Light Company, a Corporation, by instrument recorded November 18, 1916, as Entry
No. 369208 in Book 3-G, page 218.

2.

Right of Vay for a Railroad spur tract, said right of way
being 8 1/2 feet on each side of, and measured at right
angles to, the following described center line:
BEGINNING at a point Vest 1*11.5 feet from the Southwest
corner of the Intersection of 10th Vest Street and First
South Street, running thence Southerly on a 15°30* curve
to the right a distance of 97.6 feet; thence Southerly
on a tangent to said curve 1*2.8 feet; thence on a !*•
curve to the left 172.2 feet to a point on the Vest line
of 10th Vest Street which point is North 113-3 feet from
the North line of Second South Street; as created in favor
of the Vestern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation,
by instrument recorded June 27, 1921 as Entry No. *52855
in Book 11-1 at page 81.
By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 5*2833
in Book 3-V, page 573t said Vestern Pacific Railroad Company
granted an easement and right-of-way over a portion of
above described tract to Oregon Short Line Railroad Company.

3.

An Agreement affecting this and other property,
recorded
September 9, 1925 as Entry No. 5*283* in Book 3-V, page
338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., and
The Vestern Pacific Railroad Co., First Parties, and Fisher
Terminal Varehouse Co., a corporation, Second Party, which
provided for relocation of present trackage and construction
of additional trackage in accordance with a plat narked
Schedule "A", attached thereto.

4.

A P e r p e t u a l E i s e i e n t for the s o l e and e x c l u s i v e use of
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, and the Western P a c i f i c
R a i l r o a d Company, f o r a r i g h t of way for t h e i r p r e s e n t
spur tracks over the following l a n d , t o - w i t :
an i r r e g u l a r
t r a c t of land being a part of Lot 6, Block * 3 , Plat "C«,
Salt Lake City Survey, and those c e r t a i n portions of vacated
F i r s t South Street (together with other property not covered
by t h i s r e p o r t ) , more p a r t i c u l a r y d e s c r i b e d in instrument
r e c o r d e d J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1926, as Entry No- 551852 in Book
3-X of Liens and Leases, at page 252.

5.

A R i g h t o f Way f o r the purpose of l a y i n g , m a i n t a i n i n g ,
operating and removing a gas pipe l i n e along the f o l l o w i n g
described l i n e :
Beginning at the West l i n e of 10th West
S t r e e t , and running thence West on F i r s t South S t r e e t ,
15 f e e t South of the Center l i n e t h e r e o f , t o the Jordan
R i v e r , as c r e a t e d in favor of Utah Gas & Coke Company,
by instrument recorded July 2 7 , 19*9 aa Entry No. 637166
in Book 44 at page 589 of O f f i c i a l Records.

6.

A Pole l i n e Easement over t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d center
line:
B e g i n n i n g at a p o i n t South " S ^ S ^ " West *70 f e e t from
a monument at the i n t e r s e c t i o n of F i r s t South
and Glendale
f
S t r e e t s , and running
thence
South
0
°
1
2
2
2
"
West
51 f e e t ;
thence North 89°58 f 22" East 436.8 f e e t , as created in f a v o r
of Utah Power & Light Company, a corporation, by instrument
recorded August 23t 19*»5. as Entry No. 1009087 i n Book
»43U at page 609 of O f f i c i a l Records.

7*
A Right of Way for a 3 Inch water pipeline along the following described
line!
Beginning at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet from the Northwest
corner of Section 29 Township
1 South, Range 1 Wert, Salt Lake Base k Meridianl and
ruining thence South 63 10v Seat 155 feet; thence South 25 30' East 85 feet, as
disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation of Water, recorded Kay 1950, as Efatrf
No. 120U02 In Book 766, page 266 of Official Records.

A P e r p e t u a l easement for a d r a i n a g e d i t c h along the North
side of West F i r s t South S t r e e t , t o g e t h e r with the r i g h t
o f t h e C i t y t o e n l a r g e s a i d d i t c h , as r e s e r v e d by S a l t
Lake C i t y , in instrument recorded September 2 2 , 1925 a s
Entry No. 5^36UU in Book 12-H, page 524 of O f f i c i a l Records.

S u p p l e m e n t a l Agreement for maintenance and o p e r a t i o n of
t r a c k a g e s e r v i n g the F i s h e r Brewing Company dated March
11, I960, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Company,
and The Western P a c i f i c Railroad Company, recorded December
2 1 , I 9 6 0 , as Entry No. 1752826 in Book 1767 at page 1*5
of O f f i c i a l Records.

Easement for pole lines and
in favor of Utah Power A Light
January 16, 1961 . as Entry
page 2*2 of Official Records,
line:

Incidental purposes as created
Company by instrument recorded
Mo. 1756733 in Book 1773 at
over the following described

Beginning at a point within an existing transmission line
which is 900 feet South and 1135.0 feet East, more or less,
from the Northwest corner of Section 2 f Township 1 South,
Rnage 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence South
O S 0 ^ * Vest 5*»0 feet on said land and being in Lots 3 and
6, of said Section 2.
Easement for pole lines and incidental purposed as created
in favor of Utah Power a Light Company by instrument recorded
January 16, 1961, as Entry Mo. 175673* in Book 1773 «t
page 2*3 of Official Records over the following described
line:
Beginning at a point at a fence on the North boundary line
of the said land at a point 8*5.0 feet South and 1170.0
feet East, more or less, from the Northwest corner of Section
2, Township 1 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
thence South 0*02' East 7*0.00 feet more or less, to a
fence on the South boundary line of said land and being
in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.

Easement for
utilities and incidental purposes over and
?«•«"«
o f a r S ai? 1 / 0 ; 2 "r e cro«r ed r dv e d in favor of Salt Lake
Si ^ M P C C * 1 *
l ?
?22S
« December 17, 1962 as Entry
No. 1888556 in Book 1998 at page 191 of Official Records.
The intertat if any, of The Vestern Pacific Railroad Coapeny,
a Delaware Corporation, acquired under and by virtue of
the Corporate Warranty Deed from The Veatern Pacific Railroad
Company, a California Corporation, dated March 29, 1979
and recorded on April *, 1979 aa Entry Mo. 3259800 in Book
a839 at page 718 of Official Records, of the following
tracts
The North 1/2 of vacated Plrat South Street adjoining Lot
1, Block 2, Jonea Subdivision on the South thereof. Also,
all of the South one-half of vacated Flrat South Street
lying between the Vest line of Clendale Street produced
and the East Bank of the Jordan River. Also, the Eaat
1/2 of vacated Clendale Street which abutts on the Vest
aide of Lot 3, Block 1, Jonea Subdivision (of Block 5*»
Plat *C* t Salt Lake City Survey.) Also, Beginning 82.5
feet North from the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2,
Jonea Subdivision, and*running thence North *9.5 feet to
the Northeast corner of Lot 23, of said Subdivision; thence
Eaat 33 feet; thenca South 3 3 f * 2 ' Vest 59.*8 feet to the
point of beginning.

The interest if any, of the Crocker National Bank, a National
Banking Association, et al., acauired under and by virtue
of the Second Supplemental Indenture dated April U, 1979
and recorded April U, 1979 as Entry No. 3259 802 in Book
UB?9 at page 711 of Official Records, of the saie tracts
described under Item No. II hereof.

15.

Any other rights of way and easements for
roads, ditches, canals, utilities, pipe lines,
etc., which may exist over, under or across
said land;

together with any interest of the estate in vacated First
South Street west of 1100 West Street and Glendale Street
north of First South, which is contiguous to the subject real
property described above, but subject to any rights therein
of Salt Lake City Corporation as claimed in Case No. 78-7764
pending in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of
Utah in Salt Lake County, styled Salt Lake City v. Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, et al.
J
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Weston L. Harris
Attorney for Trustee

Greg R. Hawkins
Attorney for Salt Lake City Corp.

James S. Lowrie
Attorney for Mountain Fuel Supply Co.

Roger Segal
Attorney for General Brewing

Company
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TRUSTEE'S DEED

J68'#90

^
THIS INDENTURE, Hade thin 3rd

day of June, 1982#

between NACM INTERMOUNTAIN, the duly appointed, qualified and
actieg Trustee of the estate of LeMel Corporation, and
GENE PAL BREWING COMPANY;
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, by an Order duly made and entered on the 27th
day of May, 1982 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division, the Honorable Ralph R.
Mabey, U. S. Bankruptcy Judge presiding, in proceedings then
pending in said court entitled "In rat LeMel Corporation,
Debtor" No. 80-00755, NACM Intermountain, in its capacity as
Trustee of the estate in Bankruptcy of LeMel Corporation, was
duly authorised and empowered to convey all of the right, title
and Interest of LeMel Corporation, the Debtor, and all right,v
title and interest of the estate of the Debtor in the real
property hereinafter described to General Brewing Companyi

*4,

and said court having determined that the requirements of Notice
and hearing under Section 11 U.S.C. 5363(b) have been met;
NOW, THEREFORE,* NACM Intermountain, in its capacity aa
Trustee of tha'aetata Of LeMel Corporation, by virtue of thek
power and authoritywJJ\ it,vested aa aforesaid, and in considers*
tion of the SXM of Ten and no/100 Dollars ($10.00) and other,
«. ^ '
valuable consideration to it in hand paid by General Brewing \
Company, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged! doea Arab]
quit~claia and convey unto tha said .General Brewing Company, *uv
-.•'

.

.

.

.

-

•

*

*

* ; *

**«!*\

all of the right, title and interest of LeMel Corporation tad nJ
.** , ' *'• * V
•- '
•^
"
<-^ '' <
r
all of the right,, title and interest of tha aatata in 'bankruptcy
.* * ' l"%l
, *"V •
*?'"
*
.•*f^
of U**el Corporation, in and to that certain real property v vX'
v

situate, lying and being in the County of Salt Lake, State of \*
Bteh*> aubiact to two leases* each for a term of veers* certain

month-to-month tenanciaa, and certain intaraats, rights of
way and *aaemanta haralnaftar deacrib:J. but othcrviee free
and claar of all llcna and other inrereita, mora particularly
daacribad aa followa to wits

PktCZL

MQ. it

All of Block *39 flat -C-, Salt Ukt City Survey
PARCEL gQ, Zi
Beginning at tht Nortbeaat cornar of Lot 6, Block *3. Flat
"C", Silt Lake City Survey and running thancc Fift * faatf
thtnea South 660 faat; thence Vtat * fatt to tha Southeaat
corntr of Lot 1 of aald Block 43; thanca Worth 660 faat
to tha point of beginning.

fABCEL 10. \l
Beginning at tha Southvert corner of aald Block *3» And
running thenca Veat 99 <~%et; thanca North 2*7.5 feat; thanca
Veat 163 faat, tore or leae, to tha Eaat bank of tha Jordan
River; thenoa Northerly along aald Eaat bank to a point
due Veat froa tha lorthweat oornar of aald Block *3» thanca
Caat to tha fforthtteat corner of aald Block *3; thenoa South
660 feet to tha point of beginning.

All of the South half of vacated Flrat South Street lying
between the Veat line of Olendale Street produced and tha
Caat Bank of tha Jordan River.
PARCH. BO. 3t
Coantnolng at tha Southwest oornar of Slook M , Plat mC*9
ialt Lake City Survey, and running thence North to roda;
thenoe Eaat 10 roda: thanoe South 10 roda; thence Veat
10 roda to the point of beginning.

f A t m BO, pi
a l l# of Lot 3, Blook 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Blook 5», Plat E
•C , Salt Uka City Surrey.
R,
Together with tha eaat half of vaca%ed Olendale Straat
adjoining on tha Vast.

8
g

8

-2-

mau.-tto.JLi
A l l of Lota 1 and 2 3 . H o o k t t JOfttS 3UBDIT13I0I of Block
$a # f l a t mC9> Salt Lake City Surtey.
Together with tho f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p o r t i o n of vacated
0 1 e n 4 a l e 3 t r < e t a d j o i n i n g on t h e E a a t | C o B e e n o i nito 6 2 . 5
f a a t Worth fro» the Southaaat oorner of Lot 1, * ° * *t
aald JONES SLBOIfISIOM, and running thanca Worth tf/ f a a t
t o tha K o r t h e j a t o o r m r l of aald L c . 2 3 ; thanca Caat 33
f a a t ; thanca South 3 i * « 2 Veat 5 9 . * * f « « t t o tha p o i n t
of ooeeanotBant.
T o f a t h a r with tha Korth o n e - h a l f of t a c a t a d F i r s t
S t r t a t adjoining on tha South.

PARCEL NO.

South

8;

Th<s following deacribed portion of vacated First South
Street being the South one-half of vacated Firat South
Street lying between the Weat line of 1100 Weat Street
and the Weat line of Clendale Street produced acroaa First
South Streets Beginning at a point 66.045 feet South of
the Northwest Corner of 1100 West and 100 South, which
corner is als.i the Southaaat Corner of Lot 1, Block 54,
Plat "C*, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence
South 66.045 feet; thence Weat 330.0 feet; thence North
66.045 feet; thence East 330.0 feet to the point of
beginning.
PARCEL NO. 9:
The following descrl.ied portion of vacated Glerdale S t r e e t s
Beoinning at the Soiv.heast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, Jonea
Subdivision of Block 54, P l a t •C". S a l : Laka C t y Survey
and running thence Ncrth 82.5 f e e t ; thance Noz ' 33* 42'
Eaat 59.48 f e e t ; thence South 132.0 f e a t thenci Weat 33
f e e t t o tha p o i n t of beginning.
Together with the North o n e - h a l f of vacated F i r s t South
S t r e e t adjoining on the South.

SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING RXOffTg OF WAY AND tASEKENTS AND XNTERISTSI

1.

09

to

Right of *ay f o r a l U U r o a d apur t r e o t , aald right of way
being 6 • 91 f e e t on eaoh a i d * of, and aeaaured at r i g h t
anglea t c , tha f c i l o w i r g deacribed center U n a :
BEGIMM: jO at a p o i n t Veav. 4 1 1 . 5 f a a t f r o * tha Southweat
corner ./ tha I n t e r a e c t i o r - of 10th Vaat S t r a a t #andf F l r a t
South S t r a a t , running t h e r c e S o u t h a r l y on a 15 30 curva
to th r i r h t a d i s t a n c e of 9 7 . 6 f a a t ; t h a n c a S o u t h e r l y
on a c a n c t n t t o a a l d c u r / t 142.8 f e a t ; thanca on a W
curv* to tha l e f t 1 7 2 . 2 f e i t to a p o i n t on tha V t s t l i t , ,
of 10 h Vest S t r e e t which point i s North 113-3 f e a t froa
tha >K.-th l i n e of Second South S t r e e t ; i b t r e a t e d in favor
o f i t * Western P a c i f i c Railroad Coapany. a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
by inairuBent recorded June 27, 1921 aa Entry !fo. 452855
in Bool 11-1 at page 8 1 .
By Agrttment recorded September 9 t 1925, Entry Mo. 5*2833
in Book 3-V, page 5*3. aald Veatern P a c i f i c Railroad Company
g r a n t e e an e a a e a e n t and r i f , h t - o f - w a y over a p o r t i o n of
above dcecribed t r a c t to Ore^a Short Una Railroad Company.
An Agreement a f f a c t l n 9 t h i a and othar property,
racordad
September 9, 1925 a t Entry Mo. 5*283* i n Book 3-W, page
3 3 8 , by and between Oregon Short t l n a **llro*d
Co., and
Tha W«»t«rn P a c i f i c Railroad Co., Plrat P a r t l e a , and Tlahar
Terminal Varehouae
C o . , a corporation, Sacond Party, which
r
tt°V?!,!{0P
« l o c a t i 0 0 of P r t i t n t trackaga and conatruction
o r a d d i t i o n a l trackaga In accordance with a p l a t aarkad
Schedule "A", attached t h e r e t o .
A P a r p a t u a l E a a a a e n t f o r tha t o l a and e x c l u a i v e uee of
Oregon Short U n a Railroad Company, and tha Veatera P a c i f i o
R a i l r o a d Company, f o r a r i g h t of way for t h e i r P r « " Q t
apur tracka over tha following l a n d , t o - w l t :
An i r ™ « u l e r
t r i c t of land baing a part of Lot 6 , Block 43* f i * t C ,
Salt Laka City Survey, and thoaa c e r t a i n portiona of vacated
r i r a t South Straat (togathar with othar proparty not covered
by thia r e p o r t ) , mora p a r t i c u i a r y d c a o r i b e d in i « * * r u * # ° *
r a c o r d a d J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1926, aa Entry Ho. 55>6S2 i n Book
3-X of Liana and Laaaas, at page 252.

15 f a a t South of tha Cantar U n a t h e r e o f , t o the Jordan
R i v e r , aa c r e a t e d in f a v o * of Otah Oaa * C o * * C o * / , \ n , * l
by i n a t r u a a n t raoorded J u l y 2 7 , 19*9 » • Kotry Bo. 637166
in Book 44 at page 569 of 0?;r}olal Racorda.
A Pole l i n e E a i e a a n t ©ve* t h e f o l l o w i n g d e a c r l b e d oenter
lines
B e g i n n i n g at a p o i n t South 69'%?'<6t22« f e e t ' 7 0 f e e t froa
a Rtnuaeot at tha l n t e r a e c t l o n of r i r a t South an* C l e n d a l e
S t . ' e e t a , and running t h e n c e South O M 2 ' 2 2 * Veet 51 f e e t ;
thence North 69*5tt'22* Eaat 436.6 f a a t . aa created In favor
of Otah Tower 4 Light Coapany, a corporation, by Inatruaant
recorded Autuat 2 3 , 1945, ao Entry Vo. 1009067 *n Book
4*4 at page 609 of O f f l o l a l Racorda.

-4-

7.

k Ri4bt of ** for a 3 l*c* « U r pipeline A1"M the foUsvin* dticrlUd

11A4I

BodinlAi at a point South « * feet aad Aft U36 feet fro. t*e * ^ T " i —
a a n J t f S e c t l o i 2t Tt^ihlp 1 South, Rat** 1 Net, «alt lato Baaa 4 K«**M
"4 • *
£mi*g thence South tf 20- iaat 155 f t t l t h « a Soutt 2? *>• *at • * / • * • "
disclosed ty Certificate of Appropriation of flater, revcrded Haj W0 t •• " " 7
No. 123U02 In Book 76*, pe<e * * of Official lecarda.

Suppleoental Agreeoent for aalntananca and optratlon or
"raclcaga aervlng the fisher Brewing Company dated March
II, I960, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Coopany,
and Th« Western Pacific Railroad Company, recorded Deceaber
21, I960, aa Entry No. 1752826 In Book 1767 at page 145
of Official Recorda.

10.

Eaaeaent for pole l l a e a and incidental purpoaea aa created
in favor of Utah Power 4 Light Coapany by inatruaent recorded
January 16, 1961» aa Entry No. 1756733 to Book 1773 at
page 242 of Official Recorda, over tha following daaoribad
Una:
Beginning at a point within an e i i a t i n g tranaalaaion Una
which la 900 faat South and 1135.0 feat Eaat, aora or l a t a ,
froa tha Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South,
RnaaeV 1 Veat, Salt Lake Baaa and Meridian, thenoe South
06M9 Vest 5*0 faat on aald land ard being in Lota 3 and
6, of aald Seotion 2.

11. Eaaement for pola l i t e a and Incidental purposed aa created
in ftror of Utah Power A Light Coapany by inatruaent recorded
January 16, 1961, at Entry No, 175673* 1« Boo* 1*73 at
page 24j of Offlolal Recorda over the following described
line:
Beginning at a point at a fence on tha North boundary line
of the aald land at a point B4S.0 faat South and 1170.0
feet East, aora or l e s s , froa tha Borthweet corner of Section
2, Township 1 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Baaa and Herid 1 en.
thenoe South 0*0«« Saat 740.00 faat aore or laaV. t o a
f j ° £ e . ° a " • J 0 " * J j » " w r ***• of • • ! < l u a and being

in Lota ) and 6 of aald Seotion I.

5
Co

12.

Eaaeaent for u t i l i t i e s and incidental purpoaea over and *~
! o r o » « **• Ureal No. 2 aa rtaerved in favor of Salt Lake P
1 1
rdf
r
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13.

The interest if aor. of Tss testers fttifis Bsilroed Co* pan jr.
a Delaware Corserstloe, sstuirsd under and by virtus of
too Corporate Warranty Dee a fro* Tss Vsstsra Pacific Railroad
Coaeany, a California Corporation dated Nareh 21, 1971
tod roeorded oa April *, 1979 *• latry so. 3259900 lo ftort
• 839 at pais Til of Offloial leeords, of the following
traots
The Worth 1/2 of vacated First South Street adjoining Lot
1- Block 2, Joaca Subdivision oa ths South tbsrcof. Also,
all or ths South cn**nalf of vacated First South Strsst
lying betvetn tDc Htt: line of Oleedale Street produced
anl the £&>t S'.Q;? of the Jordan River. Alto, the Cast
1/2 of vacated Gler.dtle Strset which abutt* on ths Vast
tide § ofe Lot 3, IXA<*C.\ 1, Jones Subdivision (of Slock 5*,
riat C ( a&it LtJ;e City Survey.) Also, Beginning 82.5
feat rtorth froo tho Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2,
Jones Subdlvltilon, en&~running thsnee Vorth 19*5 fsst to
ths Jorthsast comer of Lot 23, of said Sutdlvlalon; t i m e s
Cast 33 fsst; thtntu South 33•*1* Wast S9.*8 fsst to ths
polut of bs|loolof

Ths intsrsst if any, of the Crocker National Bank, a National
Banking Association, ct al., acquired under and by virtue
of the Second Supplemental Indenture dated April I, 1979
and recorded April a, 1979 as Entry No. 3259802 in Book
"839 *t page 711 of Official Records, of ths saas tracts
dsscrlbsd undsr Itea Mo. 11 hereof.

15.

The rights of Salt Lake City Corporation in the property
described in Parcels 8 and 9, including the right co reopen
those portions of vacated First South Street and Glendale
Street described therein.
Any other rights of way and easements for roads, ditches,
cana* ', utilities pipelines, etc., which may exist ever,
under or across said land.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the earns premises

with the appurtenances thereto unto th* said Ceneral Brewing
Company, its successors and assigns forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, NACM 1NTXW40UNTMN, as such Trustee,
has hereunto set its hand and seal the day and year first above
written.
HACK INTERMOUNTAIN

ilCO
By c S % ^ & r - ^
Executive Vice-Precidsnt,
Secretary- Kan«.g#r

-6-

5

NOTICE OF DEFAULT

3334045
NOTICF IS HEREBY GIVEN:

That KICHAKD L. BLANCK IS

Trustee under a Deed of Tr;jst dated Ouiy 6, 1977, executed by
LeM<il Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll and
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife. Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E.
Ingersoll, his wife, in which General Brewing Company, L
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman
Abstract t Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18,
1977, as Entry No. 2971310, in Book 4519, at Page 1159, of
Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt
Laxe County, Utah, describing land therein as:
SEE ArTACKMENT
Said obligations include a note in the principal sum of
$1,800,000.00.
A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which
such deed :.s security has occurred in that payments due on August
1, 1979 and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of §55,316.66,
have not beed paid.
By reason of such default, Richard L. Blanck, as
Trustee, and General Brewing Company, as Beneficiary, under said
Deed of Trust, do hereby declare all sums secured thereby iivmediately due and payable and have elected and do hereby elect to
cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
secured thereby.
DATED this 7€h day of September.
RICHARD L. BLANCK, Trustee
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On this 7th day of September, personally appeared betore
me Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee in the foregoing Notice ot
Defau.1*,, whp duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
. v . .:.;; .
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\JtjAfrj\£Ms*J
NOTARY PUBLIC
Vesiding *n S a l t Laxe County. Utah

By Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry No. 542633 in Book 3-V,
page 573, said Western Pacific Railroad Company granted an easement and
right-of-way over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company.
3.

An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry Ho. 542834 in BooV 3-W,
page 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western
Pacific Railroad Co. flrat partiea, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a
corporation, second party, vhlch provides for relocation of present
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a
plat narked Schedule "A" attached thereto.

4.

A perpetual easeaent for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line
Railroad Coapany and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of
Way for their present spur tracke over the following described land, to wit:
An irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43,
Plat "C M , Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions
of vacated First South Street (together vlth other property
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in
instrument retarded January 20, 1926 as 1'ntry No. 551852 in
Book 3 X of Liens and Leases, page 252.

5.

A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, aalntalning, operating and removal
of a gas pipe line along the following described line.:
BECINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running
West on First South Street, 15 feet Sovth of the center line
thereof, to the Jordan River; as created in favor of Utah Cas
4 Coke Coapany by instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry
Mo. 637186 in Book 44, Par.*. 5B9 of Official Records.

6.

A Pol? Line Easeaent over the following described enter line:
BECINNINC at a point South 69*58 V 22 M West 470 feet
froa a Monument at the intersection of Flrat South
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0*12'22"
West 51 feet; thence North 89*58 , 22" East 436.8 feet;
as created in favor of Utah Power and Light Coapany, a
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as
Entry Mo. 1009087 in Book 434,'1'age * 0 9 of Official
Records.

7.

A Right of Vay for a 3 Inch water pipeline along the following described
line:
BECINNINC at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet
froa the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South,
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 63*10' East 155 feet; thence South 25*30*
East 65 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of Water, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201402 in
Book 766, Page 266 of Official Records.

6.

A perpetual easeaent for a drainage ditch along the North aide of West
First South Street, together vlth the right of the City to enlarge aald
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in instrument recorded September 22,
1925, as Entry No. 543644 in Book 12-B, page 524 of Official Records.

9.

A Pole Line Easeaent granted to Utah Power 4 Light Coapany as recorded
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Page 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official
Records, for the erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of the Crantee and tvo anchori. and three poles along a line
described as follows:
BECJKNINC at • point within an existing transmission U n a which
is 900 faat Ssuth and 1139 feet East, aore or less, froa
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49* West 540 fast
on aald land and being In Lota 3 and 6 of atld Section 2.

A role Lina Easeaent granted to Utah Fewer I Light Coapeny as racordtd
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773. Fage 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official
ftecordt, for the aractioo and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacement of the electric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of the Grantee and one guy and 3 poles along a line described as
follows:
2&C1NN1NC at a fence en the Worth boundary line of the Cr an tors*
land at a point SA5 feet South and 117C feet East, more or lets,
froa the Northwest corner of Section 2, Tov-nshlp 1 South, ftange
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 0*02* East 740 feet.
aore or less, to a fence cm the South boundary line of said land
and being In Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.
Any other rights of way and easeaeats for roads, ditches, canals, utiliti
pipe lines, etc., which a»y exist over, under or serosa said land.
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STATE OF UTAH

)
I SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
0:1

tn

*

3rd

day of June, 1982, personally appeared

before me, Robert H. Cleiidenen, who being by me duly sworn
did say, that he, the said Robert H. Clendenen, is the
Executive Vice-President, Secretary-Manager of KACM XnteriTOuntein,
and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in
behalf c" said corporation by Authority of A reoolution of
Its board of directors and was signed by said corporation in
its officisl cApAcity A S Trustee of the estste of LeMel
Corporation by virtue of the power invested in it as such
Trustee.

T73TAKY PUBLIC, Residing at
Salt-. Lake City, Utah

r0</N
^f^^pmafc^ssion Expires t
6/26/84
B
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Exhibit I

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
interstate Land Corporation
.9:10 South 5200 Uest
West Jordan, Utah 94084
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

GENERAL BREWING COMPANY, a corporation ^rgnriied and
existing under the laws of the State of California, with its principal
office at 79 St. Thomas Way, Tib'iron, California, hereby conveys and
warrants against all claims by, through or under GRANTOR to
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION. GRANTEE, for the sum of Ten and
no/100 Dollars (S10.00) and other good and valuable consideration the
tract of land in Salt Lake County, "tah, described on Exhibit "A" which
is at ached hereto.
THE OFFICER who signs this deed hereby certifies that this
deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorizes under a
resolution duly adopted by the Board of Directors of the GRANTOR at a
lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate
name and seal to be hereunto aifixed by its duly authorized officer this
TtL

day of ^MJUUAJ^

.

1984.

GENERAL BREWING COMPANY

CAt\
PRESIDENT
STATE OF WASHINGTON )
COUNTY OF CLAPK

)

On the 7th day of February
, 19f,4, personally appeared'
before me CARL E. MULLEN, JR., being by me duly sworn, did «ay that
he, the said CARL E. MULLEN. JR.. is the President of the General
Brewing Company, and that the within and foregoing instrument was
signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its
Board of Directors and said CARL £. MULLEN. JR.. duly acknowledged
to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation.

W0TMY jrofcfgfln
in$1or'*th7k\*\«
WashingtoTi, residing at Vancouver

H

flKEL IQ> U
All of Block 13. Plat *C-, Stlt U k t City Survty
fktCIL BO. 2t
Btglnnlng i t tht North**%t eorntr of Lot 8, Block *3, Plat
"C", Salt Lakt City Survey and running t h t n e t Cast * f t t t ;
t h t n e t South 660 f t t t j thtnet Vtat * f t t t to tht Southtaat
eorntr of Lot 1 of said Block A3; t h t n e t North 660 f t t t
to tht point of btglnnlng.
MUCH TO, M
B t g l B o l R i at tht Southwtit eorntr of said Block * 3 , and

out n i t i r o i vot nsrinwui eorntr ox 111a DIOCK •» 3; intnct
Eatt to tht Northvtat eorntr of said Block *3; thtr.ee South
660 f t t t to tht point of btglnnlng.
f l t e n * 0 . At
All of tht South half of vaeattd Plrat South Strttt lying
bttvtta tht Vtat lint of Cltndalt Strttt pr.duetd and tht
Cast Bank of tht Jordan Blvtr.
P U C E L 10. %\
Conttnerng at tht Southvtat eorntr of Block u , plat " C ,
Salt Lakt City Survty. and running thtnet North 10 rods;
„hanct Caat 10 roda: thtnet South 10 rods; thtnet Vttt
10 rod* to tht point of btglnnlng.

fAnm 13. fil
• 11 of Lot 3. Block 1, JOKES SUBDIVISION of Block SA, f l i ;
•C% Salt Lakt City Survty.
T o g t t ! i t r with t h t t a a t h a l f of vaeattd Cltndalt

Strttt

tdJoining on tht Vtat.

EXHIBIT "A"
•-!•

n f i f t i i a . Tt
i ^ of Lett 1 ted 2 3 , Hook 2, 4C1E3 SUltlvi'XOW of Bl*eV
5*, f l a t « C \ Salt U k t City Survey.
\ * | t t h t r «rlth t h t f o l l o w i n g dascribed portion of vactttd
• t n d t l t S t * t t t t d j o l n l n f on t h t E a s t ; Ccsjaeneinf 6 2 . 1
f t t t Horth from tht Southeast eorntr of Lot 1, Block 2,
atid JOKES SUBDXfXSIOM, and runnlnf thtnce f o r t h 66 f t t t
t o t h t N o r t h e a s t oorntr of t t l d l o t 23* '•'tnea Etst 33
fteO; thence South 3 3 # * 2 ' V t t t 5 9 . * 8 f t « t :o t h t p o i n t
of aottaV^neta* « t .
T o f t t h t ^ rfitrt t h t Worth o n t - h a l f
S t r t t t tdjctnlnf oo tht South.

of v t c t t e d F i r a t

South

/
FAE'CL NO. 3t

* Tht following dttcribtd portion of vactttd First South
Street being tht South ont-htlf of vajattd Firat South
Strttt Ikying between tht Watt lint of 1100 Wtat Street
and tht west line of Gltndalt Strtet produced across First
Scjth Street: Beginning at a point 66.045 feet South of
the Northwest Corner of 1100 West and 100 South* which
ccrnsr it also tne Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 54,
Flat *C". Salt eke City Survey, and running thence
SoutJt 66.045 ftt ; ihence Wf-st 330.0 feet: thence North
66.C45 feet; thence East 330.0 feet to tne point of
beginning.
PAJ.CEL NO. 91
Tht following described portion of vacated Glendale Strttt:
Btginning tt tht Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, Jones
Subdivision of Block 54, Vlat *C", Salt Lake City Survey
and running thtnet North 02.5 fttt: thenct North 33* 42'
East 59.48 fttt? thenct South 132.0 f«et thtnet West 33
fttt to tht point of baoinning,
Togtthtr with tht North one-half of vactttd First South
Strttt adjoining on the 5outh.

SUBJECT TO TBI FOLLOWING FlGliyS OF WAV AND EASEKTNTS AND XNTERTSTS:

" i!'S"I\^
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Bight of Way for t Railroad spur tract, said right of way
btlng 6 1/2 fttt on ttch slCa of, tnd atisurtd at r i g h t
unfits to, tht following dtacrlbtd etnttr lint:
B E G I M U R G it a point Wtst *11. 5 fttt froa tht Southeast
eorntr of tht lottrstctlon of 10th Vtst Strttt tnd First
South Strttt, running thtnet Southtrly on a 15•30• curvt
to tht right a dlstanet of 97.6 ftet; thtnet S o u t h t r l y
00 a t a n g a n t to aald curvt 112.6 fttt; thtnet on a ia*
C
r r ? « A ° u l M l . tft l 7 2 ' 2 f # t t t 0 • Polnt'on tnt Vtst lint
?f l? 11 *.**!! 1 S l r V l " h l c h > o l n t *» K « r ^ h 113.3 fttt fro.
• V / a ? I w . U ° A - 0 f . S t ? ^ d S .° U t , h S t r i t t J •• crtattd In favor
of tha Vtsttrn Pacific Railroad Coapany, a corporation,

)i sScr^ n v;Vt°«a d ;?. Junt "•,9?1 ts -ntpy K °- i5285i
!

^ co
/r itr^\mlnt
• ^, d •' , S t p t t a b t r 9, 1925, Entry Ko. 5*2833
p t | t i 5 3# i i l d
ll.f?~J
'
*•»*•"» Pacific Railroad Coapany
t r i o t t d an t a a a a c n t and right-of-way o v t r a portion of
abova dtacrlbtd tract to Ortgon Short Lint Nllroad Coapany.

i ! * ? ! ! ! ! ! 9 * " ? ! f t c t l n 9 . t h i i * n d o t h e r P™***^*
rtcordtd
n 8 , by and bttwtan Oragon Short Lint Railroad Co., and
Tarainal Varahouat Co., a corporation, Stcond Party, which
0f prt,tnt
trr°"*22iJ*0«*?fl?f:*lton
trackagt tnd construction
of a d d i t i o n a l trackagt m accordanct with a plat airktd
S:htdult «A«, attachtd t h t r t t o .
A P t r p t t u a l Eaaaaant for tht a o l t and t i c l u s i v t uat of
Ortgon Short Lint Railroad Coapany, and tht Vtsttrn P a c i f i c
R a i l r o a d Coapany, for a right of way for t h a i r prtaant
spur trackf ovar tha following land, t o - w l t : An i r r a g u i a r
t r a c t of land balng a part of Lot 6, Block * 3 , Pl»t "C",
Salt Laka City Surety, and thoat ctrtain portlona of vacatad
Firat South Straat (togathar with othar proparty not covtrtd
by t h l t raport), aora p a r t l e u l a r y daacribtd in l n a t r u a t n t
recorded January 2 0 , 1926, aa Entry Ko. 55H52 In Book
3-X of Liana and Laaata, at pagt 252.
• A Right of Way f o r tha purpoai of l a y i n g , a a l n t a l n l n g ,
oparatlng and raaovlng a gai plpt Una along tht f o l l o w i n g
dtacrlbtd U n a : Btglnnlog at t h t Vaat l i n t of 10th Vast
S t r a t t , and running thtnet Vast on F i r s t South S t r t t t ,
15 f t t t South of tht Ctnttr l i n t t h t r t o f , to tht Jordan
Ri?ar. aa crtatad in favor of Utah Gas & Cokt Coapany.
by l n a t r u a t n t rtcordtd July 2 ' , 19*9 aa Entry Ho. 637186
la Book M at paga 509 of Official Rteords.
A Poit H o t E t t t a t n t o r t r tht f o l l o w i n g d t a c r l b t d c t n t t r
Hat:
B t g l n n l o g at a point South 69*5B > 22* Vtat *70 f t t t froa
a aoouatot at tha l a t t r a t e t i o o of f i r a t South
and Cltndala
S t r t t t a , and running
thaaat South 0 « i » t t l " Vtat 51 f t t t r
thtaat Korth 8 9 , S * , ! t « Cast *3*M f««% • • artattd in favar
of Otah Powar A Light Coapaay, a vorsoration. by lnatruatnt
rtcordtd Auiuat 1 3 . 1M5, •* **tr~ Br. 106felT in Boat
*3* i t paga 609 of O f f i a U l Rttorda.

7.
A *!*% af * y f* a 3 i ~ * - t * ' JAP***" *<*" « - ******** * * " r t * 4
Uaat
eo^eTofSactlon 2, Township 1 South, 1U,4* 1 Bet, ***&*,.**"*
*?££'>
£ £ £ * thtact South «FlO« Utt 155 f t t i thane feuth 25° 30- East 15 fttt.
dlaclofad toy Certificate of Appropriation of Water, recorded Kay 1950. at totry
Ho. 120U02 la Book 7*«, ***• 266 of Official. Beeorda.
A Ferpetuai easeotnt for a drainage ditch along the Berth
aida of Wast F i r s t South S t r e e t , together w:th tha right
of the City t o e n l a r g e said d i t c h , as reserved by S a l t
Lake City, in instrument recorded Septaabtr 22, 1925 ae
Entry Bo. 5*36** in Book 12-H, paga 52* cT Official Records.

Supplemental Agreement for maintenance and operation of
trackage serving the Fisher Brewing Company dated March
11, I960, by and betwaeo Oregon Short tine Railroad Company,
and Tha Vastern Pacific Railroad Company, recorded December
21 I960, as Entry Ko. 1752626 In Book 176? at page 1*5
of Official Records.

10.

Easement for pola l i o n ar.d Incidental purposes as created
In favor of Otah Fowar 4 Light Company by Instrument recorded
January 16, 1961, as Entry No. 1756733 in Book 1773 s t
page 242 of Official Records, ovar tha following described
Una:
Beginning at § point within an e x i s t i n g transmission Una
which la 900 feat Soutl and 1135.0 feet Eaat, mora or l a s s ,
from tha Borthweat corner of Section 2, Townahlp 1 South,
Rnace 1 Vast, S a l t Laka Base and Marldlan, ther.co South
0 6 # « 9 ' Vaati5*0 f e a t on aald land and being In Lots 3 and
6, of said Section 2.

11. Eaeemant for polo l l n a e ard i n c i d e n t a l purposed as creftad
In favor of Otah Fowar A Llg.it Company by instrument recorded
January 16, 1961» as Ent"y Bo. 175673* in Book 1*73 i t
page 2*3 of Official Records ovar tha following daaeribad
Una:
Beginning at a point at a fance on tha Borth boundary l l o e
of tha said land at a p o i n t 0*3.0 f e a t South and 1170.0
featT o Eaat,
mora or l e a s , from tha Borthwast corner of Section
2
wilf lB 1
L
*
*o»*h, Range 1 Baat, Salt Lake Base and Karidiaa.
thence South 0*02 f Eaat 7*0.00 feat mora or l a s s , t o a
fanoa oa tha South boundary Una of aald land and being
in Lota 3 and 6 of maid Section 2.

U#

Caaamamt for u t i l i t i e s and I n c i d e n t a l purposts ovar and
aeroaa
the Faroel Fo. t aa rertrvad in favor of Salt Lake
S 1 1 7 ,! 1 .*..^* 1 ! C 1 , 1 S *!!2 FtmoKtd tecamber 17, 1 | 6 | as Entry
Bo. 1988556 in Book 1998 at »§«• 191 of Official /taeorde.

• 5-

The Interest If any, of The V«st«ra Feeifie Jellroed Company,
• O i l i v i n Corporation, acquired uodar 4nd by U r t u t of
the Corporate Varraoty Deed froa The Veetero Faclflc Railroad
Coapany, a California Corporation, dated Hareh 29. 1979
and recorded oa April * 9 1979 aa Entry *o. 3239000 1« Book
•839 at page 718 of O f f l o l a l Records, of tba f o l l o v i o g
t.racta
1
Tba forth 1/2 of vaoated Flrat South Jtreet adjoining Lot
1, Bloc'i 2, Joaes Subdivision ao tba South tbaraof.
Aiao,
a l l of iha South ©ae-half of vacated f l r a t South S t r t t t
l y l e t between tha Vtkt I l e a of Qlaadala Straat produead
and t h t f a a t Bank of tha Jordan Biver. l l s o , tha t t s t
1/2 of vacated Qlaadala Straat which abuttf oa tha Vast
Blda of Lot 3* Blook 1, Joaaa Subdivision (of Block 5*,
Flat *C*# S a l t Laka Cl.y Survey.) A l t o , Beginning 8 2 . 3
f a a t forth froa tha Southaatt co air of Lot 1, Block 2,
Joaai Subdivision, aniTruaalBC thaset.Worth 89.5 f t a t to
tha Bortheast toraar of Lot 23, of tald Subdivision; thence
Cait S3 f a a t ; thaata South 33**2' Vest 59.88 faat to t h t
polet of beginning.

Tha lntarast If any, •. t>e Crockar Nitior.al Bank, a National
Banking Association, n a l . t acquired under and by v i r t u e
c f tha Second Supplemental Indenture dated Aaril *. 1979
and recorded April 8, 1970 a 9 Entry No. 3259802 In Book
8B39 at page 711 of O f f i c i a l Records, of the saoe tracts
described under Itea No. 11 hereof.
Tha rights of Salt Laka City Corporation in the property
described in Parcala 8 and 9, including the right to reopen
thoae portiona cf vacated First South Street and Clendale
Street described therein.
Any *ther rights of way and easements for roads, d i t c h e s ,
canals, u t i l i t i e s , p i p e l i n e s , e t c . , which may e x i s t over,
under or acroaa aaid land.
Subje:t to rights of tenants in poraesaio.i.

State of Utah
bounty ot Soil Lake

) APR 23 1986
*'!•'-

L'f-i- v
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED

0555782

( CO*l»0* ATI*. I OR M ]

LEMEL CORPORATION
, a corporation
organized *nd existing under the lawi of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
S a l t Lake C i t y
, of County of
S a l t Lake
. State of Utah,
grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to
R.D.

PATTERSON

of

S a l t Lake County
Ten and n o / 1 0 0
and other good and valuable considerations
the following described tract of land in
Salt Lake
State of Utah:

grantee
for the sum of
— DOLLARS.
County,

The West half of Glendale and South half of
First South Streets, went of 1100 West in
Salt Lake City, Utah, as vacated by the
City of Salt Lake by an ordinance passed
by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City. Utah on the 5th day of October, 1977
and published on the 15th day of October,
1977, the entirety of said Glendale and
First South Streets west of 1100 West being
more particularly described as follows:
(See Schedule "A" attached)
il
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this 2 7 t h
day of
July
, A. D. 1979
Attest:

[tOUPORATE SEAL]

STATK OY UTAH,
County of S a l t Lake
On the
27 t h
day of
July
A. D.
personally appeared before me MELVIN E . INGERSOLL and
who being by me d«ily sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said KELVIN E . INGEP.SOLL
is the president, and he, the said
\% l n c secretary
of
LEMEL CORPORATION
Company, and that the within jnd foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
director* and said y^lVIN E . INGERSOLL
and
each duly acknowled^u to me that said corporation executed the same and thajt the seal affixed
is the *c*\ of said corporation.
.
•

%rfLe£*~7'__

tv o w m i s M i m

..r*4^^_M, „„„„, ,^^-yS2 r ^^x

M «OJC- OWIT CLAIM OtCO. C O « * r o ^ W - . n ... co

APPROVED f OftM - UTAH SECURITIES C O M A - I S S I O *

SCHEDULE "A'

Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 1,
Block I, JONES' SUBDIVISION, Block 54, Plat
"C" Salt Lake City Survey, said point also
being the Northwest corner of 1100 West and
First South
Streets; and running thence South
0*2'53M East 132.17 feet;
thence West 334.00
feet; thence North 0#00'55M West 214.63 feet
to the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2,
said JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence North 33*42*
East 59.48 feet; thence East 36.00 feet to
the Northwest corner of Lot 2, Block 1, said
JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence South 132.00 feet;
thence East 264.00 feet to the point of beginning.

Stato of Utah

j

Co-.in!y of San t a k 3

1

I. the undersigned. Recorder of Sa'l Lake County.
Utafi eo hcv^by ce/tiry ifta* by Jew I hsve Mi*

ojw&y

of a scfil ?.v.ci ?..'• p a w s tJoc'Jwepfs. record*, t r d otner
«fiJ :'i«s: i«'ii ? <i6.\ej C'-J ."«.••:•;•.•:/»£ •$ S. Jrus arte •<#«.'
ApHnc**-•«., ,
- i - ^ _ ^ . ^ , ,

-'••--•• • • ' - M « i . c » . H e e l e r
0

;

_^

1

^

««•.'.«*,

UWi

Exhibit K

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
P a t r i c k J . O'Hara
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f I n t e r s t a t e Land
Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
R

)
)
)
)

D. PATTERSON,

)

Defendant.

)

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO INTERVENE FILED BY
MELVIN E. INGERSOLL, MARIAN
BEVERLY INGERSOLL, LELAND R.
INGERSOLL, AND EVELYN E.
INGERSOLL
Civil No. C-85-0790
Judge Phillip R. Fishier

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff
Interstate Land Corporation ("Interstate") against defendant
R.D. Patterson ("Patterson") came on regularly for hearing
Monday, May 5, 1986.

The Court's ruling on InterstateTs motion

for summary judgment is in a separate order.

The motion for

permission to file a complaint in intervention filed by
proposed plaintiffs in intervention, Melvin E. Ingersoll,
Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E.
Ingersoll (herein the "Ingersolls") also came on regularly for
hearing at that time.
O'Hara.

Interstate was represented by Patrick J.

Patterson was represented by Ralph J. Hafen.

Ingersolls were represented by Ronald C. Barker.

The

The Honorable

Q0
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Phillip R. Fishier was presiding.

After hearing the arguments

of counsel, the Court took the motion under advisement.

After

fully considering the arguments of counsel and all relevant
papers filed by parties with the Court, and for good cause
shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Motion to file a complaint in intervention

filed by the Ingersolls
ixsujLJLS is
J.5 hereby
iieieuy denied.
ueuieu.
ENTERED this

^

day of J ^ ^ t ,

1986.

BY THE COURT:

L

District Judge Phillip Pu Fishier

ATTEST
Crk

& ^{CkiUJ^-^^^1

-2-

<^ uty Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, the
undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing proposed form
of "Order Denying the Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E.
Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, and
Evelyn E. Ingersoll" was served on opposing counsel before
being presented to the Court for signature.

A copy of the

foregoing proposed Order was served on counsel listed below by
mail, postage prepaid, this

I5T day of August, 1986, and will

be presented to the Court not prior to the

11 *- day of August,

1986:
Ralph J. Hafen
Attorney for Defendant
402 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Proposed Plaintiffs
in Intervention Melvin E. Ingersoll,
Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R.
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692

Patrick J. O'Hara
Attorney for Interstate Land
Corporation

47880
080186
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Exhibit L

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Patrick J. O'Hara
Attorneys for Plaintiff Interstate Land
Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. C-85-0790
Judge Phillip R. Fishier

vs.
R. D. PATTERSON,
Defendant.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff
Interstate Land Corporation ("Interstate") against defendant
R.D. Patterson ("Patterson") came on regularly for hearing
Monday, May 5, 1986.

The motion for permission to file a

complaint in intervention filed by proposed plaintiffs in
intervention Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll,
Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll (herein the
"Ingersolls") also came on regularly for hearing at this time.
The Court's ruling on the Ingersollfs motion to intervene is in
a separate order.
O'Hara.

Interstate was represented by Patrick J.

Patterson was represented by Ralph J. Hafen.

Ingersolls were represented by Ronald C. Barker.
Phillip R. Fishier was presiding.

The

The Honorable

After hearing the arguments

nnnl.49

of counsel, the Court took the motion under advisement.

After

fully considering the arguments of counsel and all relevant
papers filed by parties with the Court, and for good cause
shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Interstatefs Motion for Summary Judgment against

Patterson, which was filed with the Court on or about April 25,
1986, is hereby granted.
2.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Court determines that Interstate is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law because there are no
material facts in dispute.

The Court hereby incorporates by

reference and adopts as undisputed findings of the Court the
"Statement of Undisputed Facts" in the "Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" filed with the
Court on or about April 25, 1986.
3.

The Court hereby enters summary judgment in favor

of Interstate against Patterson that Patterson has no right,
title or interest whatsoever in that certain parcel of real
property more particularly described in that certain Quit-Claim
Deed recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on
March 11, 1982 at Book 5349, Page 1360 (hereinafter "The
Patterson Quit-Claim Deed").

-2-

QOOtS

4.

The Court further enters summary judgment in

favor of Interstate against Patterson that the parcel of real
property described in The Patterson Quit-Claim Deed is also the
same real property described more particularly as Parcel Nos. 8
and 9 in that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded at the
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office February 14, 1984 at Book
5531, Page 545 (hereinafter the "Interstate Special Warranty
Deed").
5.

As a matter of law, and based on the undisputed

documents of record pertaining to said real property, the Court
hereby enters summary judgment in favor of Interstate that
Patterson acquired no right, title or interest pursuant to the
Patterson Quit Claim Deed because, at the time the Patterson
Quit Claim Deed was executed by the Grantor named therein
(i.e., LeMel Corporation), the Grantor had no right title or
interest in the subject property.

The Court rules as a matter

of law that the Grantee, Patterson, acquired under the
Patterson Quit Claim Deed no more than the Grantor, LeMel
Corporation, had.

The Court further determines as a matter of

law that as of the date of the purported conveyance LeMel had
no interest to convey whatsoever in the real property described
in the Patterson Quit-Claim Deed.
6.

Interstate's motion for summary judgment on the

issues raised by Patterson's Third, Fourth and Fifth
affirmative defenses is also granted.

-3-
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7.

The Court hereby enters summary judgment in favor

of Interstate and against Patterson on Patterson's Third
Affirmative Defense because the Court rules as a matter of law
that Patterson may not offer parol evidence regarding the
unambiguous documents of record filed with the Salt Lake County
Recorder pertaining to the real property at issue in this
lawsuit.
8*

The Court also enters summary judgment against

Patterson and in favor of Interstate on Patterson's Fourth and
Fifth Affirmative Defenses because the Court hereby rules as a
matter of law that all necessary parties are before the Court.
9.

Because the Court has entered summary judgment on

all issues raised in Interstate1s complaint and on all
affirmative defenses raised in Patterson's Answer, this is a
final order adjudicating all issues raised by the parties in
the above-captioned proceeding.
ENTERED this

M^ day of^AugtHft, 1986
BY THE COURT:

ixS^OJ^jJy,

District Judge ^Phillip R. -Fich-tgT

ATT.; —
Py f<f)K

4-

t

J

duAok.
Daputy Cleric

QQ0l5$

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, the
undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing proposed form
of "Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Defendant" was served on opposing counsel before being
presented to the Court for signature.

A copy of the foregoing

proposed Order was served on counsel listed below by mail,
postage prepaid, this

/ <>T day of August, 1986, and will be

presented to the Court not before the

\\ - day of August, 1986:

Ralph J. Hafen
Attorney for Defendant
402 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Proposed Plaintiffs
in Intervention Melvin E. Ingersoll,
Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R.
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692

r

t^fc^ J- £ > < ^

Patrick J. O'Hara
Attorney for Interstate Land
Corporation

47860
080186
-5-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
R. D. PATTERSON

CIVIL NO. C 85-790

Defendant.
This

matter

came

before

the

court

on

the

motions

of

defendant R. D. Patterson and proposed Intervenors to correct
previous orders.
59(a)(6)

and

The motions are expressly premised on Rules

(7), 59(d),

59(e),

60(b),

U.R.C.P.,

"or other

applicable rules" and are directed at the following orders:
1.

Order Denying Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E.

Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll,
and

Evelyn

E.

(hereinafter

Ingersoll,

referred

to

dated
as

September
the

"order

4,

1986

denying

intervention").
2.

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

against

Defendant, dated

September

4,

1986

(hereinafter

referred to as "summary judgment order").
The motions in question are contained in a single pleading
dated September 13, 1986 and filed on September 15, 1986.

It

ooov^

INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON

OPINION AND ORDER

PAGE TWO

was plaintiff, however, that caused the motions to be heard by
the court on October 20, 1986, by its filing of a Notice of
Hearing.
The court heard the arguments of counsel on October 20,
1986, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and took the matter under advisement.
Thereafter,

the

court

reviewed

the

entire

file,

including

specifically the plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment
and

supporting papers, the original Motion to Intervene and

Proposed Complaint in Intervention and the transcript of the
hearing of May 5, 1986 on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

and

proposed

Intervenors1

Motion

to

Intervene

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the original motions").
The following procedural facts are significant:
1.

The original motions were fully presented to the court

and argued on May 5, 1986.

No legal memoranda, brief or

evidence were submitted by the defendant or the proposed
Intervenors.

At that hearing, counsel for the proposed

Intervenors proposed to submit a post hearing memorandum
(Tr. p. 13) but none was forthcoming.
2.

The court, per Judge Fishier, took the matter under

advisement and thereafter issued his ruling by means of a
minute entry dated July 28, 1986.
3.

Proposed written orders incorporating the court's ruling

were mailed by plaintiff to opposing counsel on August 1,
1986.

Defendant and proposed Intervenors did not object to

,,^(

\*± *T*£i
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OPINION AND ORDER

the form or substance of these proposed orders•

Thereafter,

on September 4, 1986, the order denying intervention and the
summary judgment order were entered by the court per Judge
Daniels,

Judge

Fishier

having

previously

resigned

his

position on the court•
4.

The tenth day following entry of the summary judgment

order fell on a weekend and defendant filed the motions
challenging the summary judgment

order on September 15,

1986, the next succeeding day which was not a weekend or
legal holiday.

Consequently, if such motions were proper

under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., they were timely filed under Rule
59(b).
The

primary

issue presented

is whether the motions in

question are truly Rule 59 motions.

The resolution of this issue

impacts not only the consideration of the motions by this court
but, more significantly, the finality of the judgment in question
and thus the timeliness of any appeal to the Supreme Court of
Utah.

For the reasons set forth below, this court deems the

motions as not properly filed under Rule 59.
The motions

in question

59(a)(6) and (7) and 59(d).
reference

a

"new

are

premised

in part

on Rule

Each of these subdivisions expressly

trial"

as

the

contemplated

relief.

Consequently, they are applicable only when a trial has preceded
the motion.

In summary judgment proceedings no trial takes place

and, in accordance with Rule 52(a), findings and conclusions are

nni H.79
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Thus, a challenge to the entry of the summary

judgment order cannot be premised on subdivisions (a) or (d) of
Rule 59.

Additionally, Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to the summary

judgment proceedings.
The remaining question under Rule 59 is whether subdivision
(e) is a proper vehicle to challenge the rendering of a summary
judgment.

Depending

question,

a

further

on

the

issue

resolution

may

be

of

this

remaining

whether

Rule

59(e)

is

appropriate to challenge a summary judgment when no new evidence,
fact or even legal argument is presented in support of the Rule
59(e) motion.
Rule 59(e), which is identical to Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, has been a part of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure from their inception.

Rule 59(e) was, however,

an addition to the federal rules in the 1946 amendments.
Advisory

The

Committee Notes to the federal rules indicate that

subdivision (e) was M... added to care for a situation such as
that arising in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, ... 146
F.2d 321 [(8th Cir. 1944)] and makes clear that the district
court possesses the power asserted in that case to alter or amend
a judgment after its entry."

In Boaz the court held that the

district

power

court

had

inherent

to

amend

a

judgment

of

dismissal without prejudice to a judgment of dismissal with
prejudice.

While such power of amendment inheres in the court

rendering the judgment, the use of Rule 59(e) for amendment of

PAGE FIVE
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judgment is applicable in very limited situations such as those
presented in Boaz.

The Advisory Committee Notes themselves thus

suggest

59(e) was not

that Rule

intended

for the wholesale

challenge of judgments when the other provisions of Rule 59 do
not apply.
In the instant case, the Rule 59(e) motion does pose a
wholesale attack on the summary judgment order.

While cast as a

Rule 59 motion, it is in fact a motion to reconsider.

There are

various specific rules which allow a party to seek reconsideration following a trial. Rules 50(b), 52(b) and Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
The logical place for a similar rule upon which to premise a
reconsideration of a summary judgment would be in a subdivision
of Rule 56. No such rule, however, exists.
Provision of an express and specific mechanism to reconsider
a final judgment, such as those prescribed in Rules 50(b), 52((b)
and 59, is necessary so that a motion for reconsideration can
stay the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal.
allow

Rule

59(e)

to

be

used

as

a

catchall

means

To

to seek

reconsideration of any final judgment merely provides a means to
challenge the integrity and finality of this court's judgments
and allows the moving party further time within which to file an
appeal.
There

are

numerous

thresholds

in

summary

judgment

proceedings in which a party opposing the motion may be heard.
Quite obviously, the party may submit opposing papers, memoranda

nntilSl
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and briefs and be heard at oral argument•

Following any hearing

and while the court has the matter under advisement, the party
opposing the motion may make further submissions.

Even if the

matter is not taken under advisement, a signed judgment is always
necessary under Rule 58A.

Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules

of Practice requires service of a proposed judgment on opposing
counsel and allows five days for objection.
final judgment be entered.

Only then can the

Thus, Rule 2.9 provides the opposing

party with an opportunity by means of objection to convince the
court that its previously ruling was erroneous.

No further

mechanism for reconsideration is necessary or desirable.
The instant case is illustrative.

The plaintiff originally

presented this matter to the court on May 5, 1986, in a hearing
on its Motion for Summary Judgment.
opportunity

to

file

papers,

opposition.

No such items were filed.

Defense counsel had the

memoranda,

and

affidavits

in

Counsel for the proposed

Intervenors filed a Motion to Intervene and a Proposed Complaint
in

Intervention.

At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment, defense counsel and counsel for the proposed
Intervenors were heard.
The court thereafter had the matter under advisement for
over two months during which time defendants and the proposed
Intervenors made no filings or submissions.

While counsel for

the proposed Intervenors did propose to file a post hearing
memorandum (Tr. p. 13), none was forthcoming.

It is particularly

000182
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at no time have defendant or the proposed

Intervenors submitted affidavits or the like raising a genuine
issue of material fact.

Following the minute entry of July 28,

1986, which was mailed to all counsel, neither defendant nor the
proposed
ruling.

Intervenors
Moreover,

no

requested

this

objections

court to reconsider

to

the

proposed

its

judgment

submitted by plaintiff's counsel were interposed under Rule 2.9
of the District Court Rules of Practice.
Defendant and the proposed Intervenors now, however, seek to
have this court reconsider its final judgment by means of its
Rule 59 motions.

At the hearing of October 20, 1986, counsel for

defendant and intervenors admitted on the record that there was
nothing before the court, including new legal arguments, that had
not previously been submitted and argued at the May 5 hearing on
the original motions.

The only thing different was that there

was a new judge, Judge Fishier having resigned before the formal
entry of the written judgment.
The courts which have addressed the issue are split, some
holding that Rule 59(e) is not a proper vehicle to challenge a
summary judgment and others holding to the contrary.
compare Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

E.g. ,

344 F Supp. 367 (S.D.

Fla. 1972) and Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889-90 (E. D.
Va. 1977) with Sidney-Vinstein v. A. H. Robins Co., 697 F. 2d
880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) and Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II,
Ltd., 652 F. 2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981).

See also Jetero Constr. Co.

INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON

OPINION AND ORDER
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v. South Memphis Lumber Co. , 531 F. 2d 1348, 1351-52 (6th Cir.
1976).
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City# 590 P. 2d 309,
310-311 (Utah 1979) addresses the issue from the standpoint of a
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus.

To that extent it

is instructive but not controlling in the context of a summary
judgment.

In the latter context many more opportunities are

generally

available

for

parties

and

advocates

to

present

argument.

Parties opposing summary judgment are also generally

presented an opportunity by means of objections under Rule 2.9 to
convince the court prior to entry of judgment that its ruling was
erroneous.
Even if Rule 59(e) was generally deemed a proper mechanism
to challenge a summary judgment, it should not be deemed a proper
use of such mechanism when no new fact, piece of evidence or even
legal argument is presented in support of a Rule 59(e) motion or
when a party opposing summary judgment fails to object to a
proposed judgment under Rule 2.9.

Under such circumstances, the

party opposing summary judgment should pursue their remedy by
appeal rather than a motion for reconsideration under the guise
of Rule 59(e).
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Rule 59 motions
are denied as being improperly premised on Rule 59.

Proposed

Intervenors1 motion for reconsideration cannot even be deemed to
be premised

on Rule 59 since they were not parties to the

00018
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proceeding when summary judgment was granted•

OPINION AND ORDER

In the event this

matter is appealed and this court's view of Rule 59 is correct,
plaintiff might be able to avoid some of the additional delay by
moving for summary disposition under Rule 10, U.R.A.P. on the
grounds that the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days
following judgment.
Because the Utah Supreme Court could disagree with the views
expressed herein and to avoid any possible remand solely for this
court to reconsider its judgment pursuant to the defendant's Rule
59 motions, the court has considered the entire record and finds
no manifest error underlying the orders entered on September 4,
1986.

The court particularly notes that it has not yet been

presented with any matter by defendant or otherwise which tends
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

For these reasons,

even if defendant's motions should be deemed properly presented
under Rule 59, the motions are denied.
The court further denies defendant's motion under Rule 60(b)
for the reason that it is a motion to reconsider and is not
properly premised on the grounds specified in Rule 60(b).

See

Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla,
1972) .

The only surprise that has been asserted was expressly

asserted at the May 5, 1986 hearing, over four months preceding
the filing of these motions, and no further memorandum was filed
after the May 5 hearing as promised.
It

is

therefore

ordered,

adjudged

and

decreed

that

00018s
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defendant's and proposed Interveners1 motions under Rule 59(a)(6)
and

(7), 59(d), 59(e),

60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other applicable

rules" are hereby denied.

DATED THIS 2nd day of December, 1986,

GtXSK

BY—<%M//^<^^^aC

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order, postage prepaid, to
Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84115-3692
Patrick O'Hara, Esq.
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Ralph J. Hafen, Esq.
402 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
This >?

84101

day of December, 1986.
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